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Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-94-212 *2 November 1994*

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NOTICE TO READERS: The processing indicators appearing in brackets at the start of each item in this publication have been changed. All indicators now begin with "FBIS" to make the material more easily identifiable in databases. Some also indicate whether the item has been translated from the vernacular or transcribed from English.

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Interior Minister Planning Changes

AU0211130794 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 2 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] On 2 November, Interior Minister Chavdar Chervenkov held a news conference at which he promised that the Interior Ministry will function more dynamically and firmly from now on. The minister announced that there will be new personnel changes in key ministry posts by the end of the week. People who accept my policy must be appointed to those posts, Chervenkov said. The goal is to lay the foundation for a more efficient mechanism for the struggle against crime.

Regarding the struggle against corruption in the state apparatus the minister said: The struggle must begin from the top. Certain sores in the country's leadership must be cut out if we want our society to believe us. Only people with clean hands must occupy the top posts. Such are the members of the cabinet, Minister Chervenkov assured the journalists.

The leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs has already held meetings with the authorities responsible for investigation and prosecution. Issues related to cooperation and coordination have been clarified.

Making an inventory of the weapons in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defense is intended to establish how much has been stolen, Minister Chervenkov said. The categories of people entitled to carry personal weapons will not be changed, he said.

The sale and distribution of weapons on the basis of Decree No. 15 have been stopped. The minister thinks the fewer weapons people have, the better.

We will see more policemen on the streets. Their shifts will be made longer, and they will be paid overtime for this. Officers will be taken out of their offices, so that they can exercise better control the policemen's activities. Security companies that do not fulfill their obligations to the police will be fined up to 100,000 leva.

DPS Leader Dogan To Run as Candidate

AU0111210994 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 1 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] On 1 November the Central Operational Bureau and the Central Election Staff of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS] discussed how to most efficiently organize and implement the DPS election program.

The situation of local DPS structures has been assessed, and DPS candidates for membership in the regional electoral commissions have been determined. The DPS regional lists will be ready by 8 November and will be approved by the Central Council on 11 November.

The rumors according to which DPS leader Ahmed Dogan will not be a candidate at the upcoming elections, have been denied.

SDS To Sign Preelection Agreements

AU0111204894 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 1 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] On 1 November the National Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] worked out the principles for finally composing the candidate lists. The requirement to have a clean past fully applies to the SDS candidates.

SDS leader Filip Dimitrov identified the organizations with which preelection agreements will be signed within several days. They are: The Christian-Agrarian Party, the Bulgarian Kingdom Federation, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Union of Macedonian Societies, the Monarchist Club, and many public organizations.

The talks with Mehmed Hodja have not made any progress.

The SDS will not sign preelection agreements with Roma organizations, despite the fact that it will work for the Roma rights.

The unused funds from the additional remuneration received by the SDS deputies—to the tune of 1 million leva—will be contributed to charity. The SDS hopes that Stefan Savov's Democratic Party will also relinquish its share of the money and also contribute it to charity.

BSP To Sign Preelection Agreements

AU0111204694 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 1 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] On 2 November the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] will sign a political preelection agreement with the Aleksandur Stamboliyski Bulgarian Agrarian National Union [BZNS] and the Ecoglasnost Political Club. This was announced at the BSP's regular weekly news conference on 1 November by Yanaki Stoilov, deputy chairman of the BSP Supreme Council. Mr. Stoilov added that by the end of the week, talks will be conducted on signing similar agreements on preelection and postelection cooperation with the Fatherland Labor Party, the Patriotic Alliance, and certain public apolitical organizations with which the BSP has already held meetings.

At the news conference, it was announced that the BSP will not appear alone at the elections because during the last few years it has issued a clear message of national consensus. In addition, the groups with which the BSP signs preelection and postelection agreements correspond to its political orientation and ideas.

Defense Minister Meets Albanian Counterpart

AU0111175294 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1500 GMT 1 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Defense Ministry Press Center reports that Defense Minister Boyko Noev met with Albanian Ambassador Koco Kote on 1 November. The main subjects discussed were the military-political situation in the region and the need for more dynamic activity in bilateral military cooperation.

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Havel, Hungary's Goncz Discuss EU, NATO

LD0111172994 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1500 GMT 1 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Czech President Vaclav Havel is in the Republic of Hungary on an official two-day visit. Our special correspondent to Budapest Martin Dorazin sums up the visit so far.

[Dorazin] Today, Havel spent four hours in the company of Hungarian President Arpad Goncz. The assessment of the situation in Central Europe, in particular the attitude about the European Union [EU] and Central European countries' incorporation into NATO, were the topics that dominated the official part of the talks.

In this connection, Havel reiterated his view that Central European countries could join NATO before joining the EU because the preparations for joining the EU were more complicated.

Speaking about European security, Havel said that, if it were not the democrats who created a new model of relations in Europe, someone else would take up this task.

Although Goncz said that Hungary viewed NATO as one of important pillars of European security, Budapest perceived this issue in a broader sense and added to it ecological and social issues.

According to Havel, the Visegrad countries' joining the EU will become a topical issue for the EU only after 1996, and, whether Central European states are admitted one by one or simultaneously is not a key issue because this matter is based on existing geopolitical circumstances.

The Hungarian president added that it is important that we continually consult the tactics and strategy of joining so that decisions are not made in Brussels without us. The two presidents also discussed the level of economic relations. In this connection, Goncz noted that they could be far more vigorous. Also discussed was cultural cooperation and preparations for the CSCE summit in Budapest scheduled for December.

This afternoon, Havel visited the Budapest town hall and toured the city.

Uhl Comments on Anonymous Witness Statute

AU0211110994 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 24 Oct 94 p 8

[Commentary by Petr Uhl: "Anonymous Testimony Is Illegal and Immoral"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Authoritarian ideological chill emanates from several recent decisions by the Constitutional Court: on the anticommunist law, restitution deadlines, and the citizenship law. The Constitutional Court judges proved, however, by the recent abolition of the institution of anonymous witness, that they do not necessarily always need to succumb to pressures from the authorities and their own ideological prejudices.

It was one of the test balloons that the Interior Ministry and the government release in their endeavors as a police state to determine the size of boots they can use when walking all over the apathetic Czech citizens.

The removal of the possibility to conceal the identity of a witness is even more valuable because the Constitutional Court made the decision only according to the law (both Czech and international), without any public support. People are won over by the propaganda that, instead of improving the police service, sees the route toward the enhancement of security through reinforcing police power by means of curbing basic human rights and freedoms. It does not come as a surprise that Minister Ruml, running no real risk of a challenge, expressed his vexation and, at the same time, the decision to feed the populist wolf of security, while seemingly keeping intact the Czech and European goat of human rights.

After all, out of caution, the Constitutional Court decided that the possibility of concealing the identity of a witness will be abolished only as of March, so that the government and parliament get a chance to legislatively deal with the problem of protection of the witness. Thus, at least until March, the identity of witnesses can be concealed in the prosecution of any criminal offense—slandering the president of the Republic, for instance, (the witness, testifying that the accused made slanderous remarks about the president, fears the slanderer's revenge, or the person who testifies that the accused did not slander the president, on the contrary, may fear the president's men, who well know that he did) or nonpayment of alimony (the witness fears the evil mother-in-law).

A Definition of Criminal Offenses Is Not Enough To Conceal the Identity of the Witness

It is a fallacy to believe that the Chamber can enshrine the institution of the anonymous witness in the criminal code, by defining the type or characteristics of the criminal offenses for which the concealment of the identity of the witness in the investigation and court proceeding would be acceptable. A three-fifths majority of the Chamber would first have to remove the stipulations of the Charter of basic rights and freedoms, according to which everybody has the right to have his case dealt with in his presence. Moreover, the Czech Republic would have to abrogate some international treaties, the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights, for instance, which guarantees every accused the right to interrogate the witnesses or have them interrogated.

The Czech Republic cannot afford to do this, and therefore, as in pre-November (1989) times, for economic reasons it must yield in the sphere of respecting human rights in its own country. The inviolability of

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basic human rights is protected in Czech society, somewhat against its own will, by the pragmatism of Klaus, Minister Dlouhy, and other men of the market economy. It is not a paradox of these times but rather proof that the international protection of human rights and economic prosperity are just two sides of the same coin of the emerging European continuity. The paradox of these times is only that those who are reaching for this coin must in the protection of human rights face their nonpragmatic colleagues, like Jan Ruml and Stanislav Devaty [Security and Information Service acting chief], who obtained their posts not for their competence (time proved them to be even desperately incompetent) but, rather, for their years of brave struggle for human rights. It is not just a paradox but also a personal tragedy for the former independent activists.

What Prevents the Chamber From Again Incorporating the Concealment of Identity

There are three groups of reasons that should prevent the Chamber from attempting to somehow salvage the institution of anonymous witness before March.

Among those related to legal procedures is, in addition to the aforementioned Charter and European Convention, the very concept of criminal prosecution (recently enhanced) as a dispute of two parties taking place before an impartial court. Not only is the confrontation of an anonymous witness with the accused not possible, but also the latter can hardly comment on the former's testimony, specifically or otherwise. He cannot object, for instance, that the witness from his place could not see or hear what he claims to have seen or heard, cannot cast doubts on the testimony by the argument that the witness is angry with him because they came into conflict or disagreement. No effective defense is possible against an anonymous testimony.

If the Czech court based its decisions on guilt and punishment primarily on such testimony, it would evoke suspicion in the bodies of the Council of Europe, the European Union, and the UN, that the violation of international legal regulations concerning legal proceedings is so gross as to enable one to derive from it the violation of everyone's right to proper and fair inquiry into and assessment of the case. The working team of the UN Human Rights Commission, in which I work, currently deals with a similar problem—namely, whether the concealment of the identity of a court senate in itself (behind the one-way glass, not transparent from the side of the accused) in one Latin American country, although used against narcotics mafiosi, is such a gross violation. (Moreover, this particular country is not bound by the European convention, and the Charter is not valid there as it is in the Czech Republic.)

The second group of reasons has more of a moral character. After all, people are afraid of all kinds of things, not only of a testimony. Life itself is just one great risk, and it is right to always ask the question of what is worth this or that risk. If, however, the Czech state enshrines such protection in a law, it will not be the best education for everyone's individual responsibility. Such a legal measure could mean the beginning of its expansion, and not only in criminal matters or only for witnesses. After all, a court testimony is a part of my personality, which I have to stake and not hide behind some other name. As we all know, it is easier to lie anonymously or under some other name. We must be protected against criminals by the police rather than by an anonymity, which is always immoral. It is in the best tradition of this country that the independent activists who stood up against the violation of human rights risked their own necks, since the founding of Charter 77 at the end of 1976, according to a program, by using their own names. (At the time, people did not believe it possible and thought that we lived abroad.) One certainly cannot demand this from a witness as a citizen, but the demand for a minimum civic responsibility is certainly justified.

The Confidential Consultant in the Wallis Affair

The last group are arguments of a purely practical character. According to the Constitutional Court data, the institution of anonymous witness has been used only twice since 1 January 1994, when the amendment came into effect. One of these instances was the Wallis affair. I could not ascertain the details of the other instance, but, in the Wallis affair, it was not a matter of concealment of the identity of the witness. The court was not applying the amendment regulations on the anonymity of witnesses but simply violated the code of criminal procedure by placing a Security Information Service agent behind a curtain in the court room (calling him a consultant), who quietly prompted two other Security Information Service female employees, whom the court believed experts, how to answer even trite questions that did not require any consultation. After all, the Plzen regional court reproached the district court for this as a fault, when it rescinded the district court decision, and denoted it as a violation of law. Devaty's canvas did not protect Tomas Kadlec from the window, so, the next day, the readers of RUDE PRAVO could enjoy a photograph of this concealed counterespionage agent—concealed not from Vaclav Wallis but, rather, from his confidants.

The same people who organize such concealments with so much success usually intimidate the public. Most recently, they have used "organized crime"—that is, international gangs of criminals—for that purpose. It is the duty of the Interior Ministry and the police to effectively counter these gangs. Instead, however, this sector populistically proposes, as does the justice minister and the minor hanger-on coalition as well as opposition parties, ineffective legislative measures of the anonymous witness type.

Why is it ineffective? The defense lawyer is usually present at the cross-examination of the witness, even of the anonymous one, in preliminary proceedings, and

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always in the actual trial. (One daily wrote something about an interrogation by telephone from another room, which is nonsense; the law expects only that the accused will be taken away from the room during the cross-examination of the anonymous witness, then brought back to ask questions through the presiding judge, removed again, the witness would enter the room, and so forth.) Even if the public is excluded, two confidants of the accused are always present at the trial. One cannot assume that the confidants and the defending lawyers are not connected with the international gang whose member is on trial. Not only can they provide a description of the witness, but they also manage to organize the revelation of his identity directly from the courtroom. The measure devising the concealment thus becomes an undignified crutch that only creates an illusion of protection of the citizen.

That, however, as in all politics, not excepting the post-November [1989] era—is the purpose of the exercise: to create illusions, to hang on to them. The public is not much interested whether such populism is a "stratagem" (of erudite lawyers) or whether it emanates from the innocent hearts of incompetent officials.

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Kukan on SR's Status After Luxembourg Meeting

LD0111170094 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 1 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The idea that the Slovak Republic [SR] has been placed into the second group of countries—signatories of the association agreement with the European Union [EU]—will not hold water. Discussions that the SR belongs to this or that group of countries seeking full-fledged membership in the EU are groundless and damaging to Slovakia. This is what Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan said today in an interview with TA SR [Slovak Republic News Agency] after returning from Luxembourg, where he attended the meeting of EU foreign ministers.

In this connection, Kukan emphasized that, in the discussion on bringing Central and East European countries closer to the EU, there was not a single contribution that would cast doubt on our delegation's participation in this meeting and Slovakia's path to full-fledged EU membership.

Parties Fail To Agree on NR SR Arrangement

AU0111132494 Bratislava SME in Slovak 26 Oct 94 pp 1-2

[Article by "(bog, jo, rk)": "The HZDS, the SNS, and the ZRS Are in Favor of Only 135 Deputies Taking Part in the Constituent Meeting of Parliament"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"Only the number of committees was agreed upon; tere will be 11. No other agreement was reached," said Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] Chairman Jan Carnogursky following the second meeting between the representatives of the parliamentary parties and I. Gasparovic, chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NR SR]. Further political talks on forming the parliamentary bodies will be held the day before the NR SR constituent meeting—that is, on 2 November.

According to Carnogursky, only the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] expressed an interest in the post of NR SR chairman. It will announce the name of its candidate on 30 or 31 October. "It seems that an agreement is taking shape among the majority of parties on creating four NR SR deputy chairman posts. We did not agree on whether the committees will be filled in accordance with the proportionate or majority system. The HZDS proposed an individual system, meaning that the parties would nominate specific people as their candidates who would or would not then be elected," added the KDH chairman.

He emphasized that the parties were unable to agree on whether substitutes for the current ministers will take part in the NR SR constituent meeting on 3 November. "The HZDS, the Slovak National Party [SNS], and the Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS) are in favor of 135 deputies taking part in the first session," said Carnogursky. He added that, in his opinion, such a meeting would not be in accordance with constitutional regulations.

"We did not agree on the fundamental issue," was Democratic Union Chairman Jozef Moravcik's comment on the meeting. According to him, the HZDS put forward proposals that will preclude the participation of members of his cabinet in the first meeting—that is, proposals that make it impossible for the entire NR SR, 150 deputies, to meet.

According to Peter Weiss, chairman of the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], there is another constitutional possibility for dealing with the issue of the substitutes. "When the government members take their oaths as prescribed by the Constitution and their mandates begin to come into effect, the NR SR chairman has the option, within 15 days, of calling in substitutes. He can do this immediately or on the basis of an agreement so that the NR SR constituent meeting is adjourned and continues the next day with the participation of the substitutes. So, there is a constitutional solution; however, it will require political will on the part of those who could decide in favor of the contrary solution—that only 135 deputies would remain in the NR SR," said P. Weiss. According to him, it looks as though the proportionate system will not be applied in forming the NR SR bodies. In his opinion, the ZRS's change of opinion, which agreed that four deputy chairman posts be created, was an interesting factor. "We will see whether the HZDS, the SNS, and the ZRS take advantage of the constitutional possibility to call in substitutes so that the constituent meeting may begin properly, with the 150 legally elected deputies," said the SDL chairman. Answering whether yesterday's failure to agree on the arrangement for parliament will have an affect on the SDL's talks with the HZDS on a possible coalition, he said that this will be assessed by the SDL Executive Committee on Friday.

Jozef Pokorny, chairman of the Green Party in Slovakia, appreciated the fact that the parties did not support merging the Environment Committee with the Agriculture Committee.

Parliament Chairman Gasparovic allowed the government members the possibility of calling in substitutes when their mandates come into effect. According to him, this will happen after they have taken their oaths and submitted their resignations. The deadline set by law for calling in substitutes, 15 days, will, according to Gasparovic, begin to be calculated when the president accepts the resignations of the government members and authorizes them to continue administering their departments. ZRS Chairman Jan Luptak replied evasively to questions on whether the ZRS deputies will support not calling in substitutes for the government members. In reply to a question on which variant—majority, individual, or proportionate—of the NR SR's arrangement they will support, he said the one the parties submit.

Carnogursky described the stance of the ZRS representative on the views of Meciar as "concurring silence." He

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allowed for the possibility that, at the first NR SR meeting, its agenda may be supplemented by anything, even personnel changes, for example, in the National Property Fund, the Supreme Inspection Office, or the management of the Prosecutor General's Office. Carnogursky commented that, if the HZDS and its allies want a majority in the NR SR, they could achieve it at any future meeting. In reply to a SME question onwhether they are considering the resignation of the current government members, who would then be replaced by state secretaries, so that the current ministers-deputies could take part in the meeting, the KDH chairman said that this would weaken the running of government and its ability to function, but it will still be given consideration.

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Delay in Russian PM's Visit Said Not Justified

LD0111191494 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1830 GMT 1 Nov 94

[Relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia network]

[FBIS Translated Text] Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrzej Olechowski has written to Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev to say that the incident at the Warsaw east railroad station should not cause Prime Minister [PM] Chernomyrdin's visit to Warsaw to be delayed.

[begin recording] [Wladyslaw Klaczynski, spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] An investigation into this matter, in which representatives of the minister of internal affairs are taking part, is in progress. Until the investigation is completed, there can be no definitive response to either the assessments or the demands expressed in the notes sent by the Russian minister of foreign affairs. This would be in breach of the principles of a law-abiding state. Nor can it be expected that this is what the Russian side wants. In this situation, one could not justify a possible postponement of Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's visit to Warsaw by the lack of a definitive reply from the Polish side to the demands of the Russian side.

Minister Olechowski sent a letter to Minister Kozyrev on this very matter today. [end recording]

[Announcer] A moment ago, the ITAR-TASS agency confirmed that the visit by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin has been postponed.

Discussion by Olechowski, Others

LD0211095494 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 0900 GMT 2 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski, Polish ambassador to Moscow Stanislaw Ciosek, and other high-ranking officials are currently meeting at the Foreign Ministry to discuss the cancellation of Chernomyrdin's visit. Polish Ambassador to Moscow Stanislaw Ciosek admits that an official explanation for the cancellation of the visit might be an excuse. The real reasons for the Russian authorities' decision are connected with internal politics.

Ambassador Ciosek recalls that Russian diplomacy, which has recently been sharply criticized by State Duma officials for lacking determination, wants to demonstrate a firm position toward Poland. Ciosek believes that the cancellation of the visit will temporarily have, as he put it, a negative effect on Polish-Russian relations. He hopes that relations improve quickly because of joint interests, particularly economic.

Interview With Russian Envoy

WS0211123094 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 2 Nov 94 p 3

[Interview with Yuriy Kashlev, Russian ambassador to Warsaw, by Edward Krzemien; place and date not given: "The Situation Is Normal"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Krzemien] Have Russian-Polish relations been good or bad over the past three years?

[Kashlev] I think that, for the first time in decades, we have had normal relations. It is also natural that we do not agree on everything, that we have disputes sometimes, and that we have differing points of view.

[Krzemien] You mean Poland's integration into NATO?

[Kashlev] Yes, I do. We know that NATO is thinking of speeding up its decisions on expanding the organization. Our stand on this issue remains the same. We do not understand why one military-political bloc should be consolidated and expanded if its adversary, the other bloc, has ceased to exist. In addition, why should such importance be given to a military organization in today's Europe?

[Krzemien] If Poland ever becomes a member of NATO, will this affect the good-neighborly relations with Russia?

[Kashlev] We also have good relations with countries that have been NATO members all along. I can only suppose that, from a military-strategic point of view, some offices in Moscow will have to take into account the fact that Poland, which, geographically, is very close, is a member of an organization that we cannot in any way consider friendly for the time being. However, I do not think we will be offended by that, that we will stop trading and talking. I cannot imagine such a situation.

[Krzemien] What happened at the East Railway Station in Warsaw was not a coincidence. Every day, citizens of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] are robbed by eastern Mafias.

[Kashlev] Indeed, this year our consulates have received 2,000 complaints from people who were robbed. However, most often the injured people are afraid of revenge and do not notify the embassy. Our consuls estimate that there might have been over 3,500 such cases, and the Ukrainian Consulate reports 2,300 cases.

Poland definitely occupies the first position in the world as a country that is most frequently visited by CIS citizens—up to 8 million people a year. Just as many U.S. citizens visit Canada. In such a mass of people, there must be some percentage of offenders.

Apart from that, the regulations in Poland are very liberal: One can easily come here and illegally prolong one's stay. In other countries, the regulations are stricter; they expel people for even minor things. I must regretfully admit that some people who are responsible for the situation do not understand how dangerous this is for Poland. This may turn Poland into a place where various Mafialike organizations will be involved in all kinds of wheeling and dealing—speculation, currency exchange, smuggling.

At the same time, in line with official Polish statistics, the number of offenses committed by foreigners in

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Poland does not exceed 3 percent of the overall number of offenses. Russians are only one-fifth of that 3 percent.

[Krzemien] However, these are only cases about which the authorities have been notified.

[Kashlev] That is true. However, it is the Polish police that have adopted the wrong attitude—you are robbing one another, and we are not interfering. This has created exceptionally favorable conditions in Poland for attacks on trains and automobiles and for street robberies—simply the best imaginable conditions for a Russian Mafia.

The Polish police cannot feel exempt from its duty—protection of the citizens of another country. At this point, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MSZ] and the Ministry of Internal Affairs do not seem to understand, or they do not want to understand, what we are complaining about, after the East Railway Station incident. We are complaining about the fact that our citizens were kept for 47 hours, and the Russian consulate was not notified. This is a violation of the consular convention between our states.

I will agree that it was just an incident. I am against drawing far-reaching conclusions from just one such case. This has only shown the bad situation that has developed.

[Krzemien] There have also appeared speculations that Russia wants to take advantage of the situation in order to force us to impose a visa requirement.

[Kashlev] We are against visas. This was and still is the joint position held by Poland and Russia. Freedom of movement is one of the methods of democratizing our lives. Incidentally, if we consider the scale of this traffic, all of the police would have to deal with the paperwork.

The fact is that we have lost control over invitations. Both our and Polish swindlers are selling them on the market. What we should do is strengthen the real cooperation of our law-and-order organs.

[Krzemien] Let us revert to the incident at the East Railway Station.

[Kashlev] To put it bluntly, what is needed is an apology from the Polish side. This will instantly alleviate the problem. The fact that we received a reply from a low-level MSZ official, a department director, came as a surprise to Moscow.

[Krzemien] Half a year ago, after Prime Minister Pawlak's visit to Moscow, you said in an interview for GAZETA WYBORCZA that it was a big success and a breakthrough.

[Kashlev] It turned out that the joint decisions made during that visit are not all that easy to put into effect. As for the construction of the gas pipeline running from Yamal to Western Europe via the territory of Poland, the agreement is almost ready. However, it is still not clear who will be the partner of our Gazprom in Poland, how the Polish side is going to finance the construction, and whether there will be guarantees from the Polish Government.

[Krzemien] What about mutual indebtedness?

[Kashlev] Again there are differences of opinion between the banks that are to calculate the old debts and turn them into securities. This has not yet been agreed to.

[Krzemien] What about the agreement on military cooperation? Russia owes us over $100 million for military equipment delivered in the 1980's.

[Kashlev] We want to liquidate the debt through deliveries of equipment and spare parts. We can deliver our version of the S-300 antirockets, such as the American Patriots, the only difference being that ours are much better. We can also equip old aircraft with modern electronic devices. The agreement is almost ready; however, several items are also missing. They will be negotiated at the last moment.

Problems of German Minorities Examined

MM0211104594 Krakow GAZETA KRAKOWSKA in Polish 20 Oct 94 p 3

[Interview with Senator Prof. Gerhard Bartodziej, a member of the Senate Foreign Affairs and Human Rights Commissions, by correspondent Pawel Barteczko; place and date not given; interview is attributed to SILESIAPRESS]

[FBIS Translated Text] Senator, in May of this year, the media related some disturbing news about instances of assault and physical violence against the residents of the town of Dziewkowice [German minority settlement] and also reported attempts to disturb celebrations at St. Anna's Mount. Since that time, we have heard no more disturbing news from the Opole region....

[Bartodziej] The fact that there is at present no disturbing news from the region of Opole Silesia does not necessarily mean that the local social and political atmosphere around the German minority in that area can be declared satisfactory. I believe that the situation is worse than it was as recently as two years ago. The deterioration of the atmosphere surrounding the German minority in the Opole region is, in my view, the result of the stemming of the progress of democratic developments. I am not talking here about democracy on a macronational scale. As a politician with no links to the central administration but hailing from local regional milieus, I note with great concern the stemming of the process of developing local democratic systems. And I also note here the steadily rising levels of social tension, which, in my opinion, are a direct consequence of the lack of progress in the task of promoting the development of democracy at local levels. It is a pity that earlier declarations and promises of partnership and cooperation coming from many local groups have so far not been

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put into practice. As for the attitude shown by the voivodship administration, we feel that our presence is just about acknowledged and merely tolerated. There is a marked absence of recognition that our presence is a fixed element in this region. I find it difficult to reconcile myself with this situation, especially because our presence here yields many positive achievements that are beneficial to the local community as a whole. But it is probable that these facts do not find favor with everyone because they do not sit easily within the paradigm of nationalistic notions.

[Barteczko] Perhaps you would like to cite some examples to illustrate your statement about the deterioration of the climate surrounding the German minority.

[Bartodziej] I believe that the Opole Voivodship authorities made a major political mistake when they blocked the progress of local integration by closing the doors of the seat of voivodship administration to representatives of the German minority. The Voivodship Office edifice lacks our representatives within its walls, while, at the parish level—that is, everywhere where power is elected rather than politically appointed—we prove every day our serious involvement in and action on behalf of the life of our local parish communities. Hence, without doubt, our recent success in the latest local city elections.

We cannot come to terms with being routinely ignored and denied participation in meetings concerning matters of supreme importance for our voivodship, especially those relating to the regional economy, and we are being kept out of these matters so consistently that no oversight can possibly be claimed as a plausible explanation of this situation. It is difficult for us to come to terms with the practice of shifting the problem of teaching German as the native tongue on to the shoulders of the social and cultural associations active within the German minority. After all, that is the responsibility of the educational authorities, and, as taxpayers and loyal Polish citizens, we are entitled to demand that our rights are respected. The question of the tax liability imposed on old-age and disability pensioners who draw their pensions from the German authorities remains unresolved by the central Polish authorities. Nor has the question of including the time during which former Wehrmacht soldiers were incarcerated in former Soviet camps into the period of pensionable service been resolved in a satisfactory manner.

The examples cited above and also others that concern questions of social benefits and provisions as well as living standards are the main reasons that we are still unable to stem the outflow of our young people to Germany because their chances for a good start in life in Germany are still incomparably greater, and such a start is less complicated than here in Poland, in their homeland. Another reason influencing young people's "voting with their feet," as this is commonly dubbed, is their conviction that people who declare their native German origin are treated as second-class citizens here in their own homeland. I share this conviction.

I believe that the situation is ripe for posing some fundamental principal questions to the authorities, questions concerning the ways in which the Polish-German treaty of good-neighbor relations and friendly cooperation is being put into practice. Are citizens of German extraction good only for being ruled over? Because the practice of ignoring their rights extends also to other provisions of international law regulations, it can be assumed that the situation in the Opole region is neither accidental nor isolated. I am also personally concerned about the awareness of a large proportion of the Polish public. They do not appear to see or appreciate the significance of the attempts to build a nationalist democracy here in place of the socialist democracy we had before. And, considering the methods of action that each of these two employ, the latter is no different from the former.

[Barteczko] Your analysis of the situation certainly would not inspire anyone with optimism. So how do you assess our politicians' declarations claiming that it is their great desire to see Poland integrated into the European Community?

[Bartodziej] My analysis of the situation demonstrates that emotions still have the upper hand in our country over common sense and reason, including political reason. This is only possible in a country where, as it appears to apply in this case, the general public, taken en masse, does not believe in European ideas. And, because they do not believe in them, they do not make any serious attempt to try to appreciate how much effort and hard work are necessary before we can become a normal partner for the European Union [EU]. What we are observing nowadays is a period of passively awaiting some expected "European fruits" to fall into our mouths, a period of waiting that is, unfortunately, not accompanied by any effort on our part to try to actually gather these fruits ourselves. I am not concerned here about the speed with which we might conceivably be expected to push a wheelbarrow around a construction site. Here in Poland people can push wheelbarrows much faster, and they can do so while running around construction sites that are organized far worse than in the West. No, I am thinking about making a multilevel effort toward transforming our administrative structures, our technical and technological standards, and even the angle from which we view the world around us. We need to transform our entire value system. It will not be enough to do it at the level of intellectual pursuits or academic speculations. The transformation of our value system must also be written into the educational programs prepared for the new generation—in primary and secondary schools, in vocational colleges, and even in kindergartens. Polish-German relations are a necessary element of that transformation and also of European integration. Within that sphere and in terms of practical international politics, Poland's integration into European structures means that we must ensure good-neighborly relations with the Germans. Increasing numbers of Poles are coming to share this view nowadays. Unfortunately, however,

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many others are still prepared to give precedence to emotions over rational arguments. I think that this is the consequence not only of our painful past and the criminal policy pursued by the Nazis in respect of Poles and Poland, but also of the propaganda disseminated in the Polish People's Republic [PRL], which dictated that we see a Nazi criminal in each and every German. We were taught to classify the normal Germans—that is, all those German people who were critical toward the Nazi legacy, in the category of sensational exceptions.

I believe that today we are reaping the harvest of the poisoned fruits planted by the PRL propaganda. This is evident from such things as, among others, the recent Szczecin Cathedral incident [anti-German slogans daubed on walls following a German-language service]. It is a pity that there is, on the whole, very little organized counteraction against these sterotypical attitudes. I am glad that it is no longer acceptable to express anti-Semitic attitudes in conversations held on public, or even ordinary, social occasions. On the other hand, it saddens me that public demonstrations of anti-German attitudes are still quite widely accepted.

[Barteczko] Thank you for talking with us.

New Preelection Alliances Forming Within ZChN

WS0111140694 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 28 Oct 94 p 5

[Article by M.D.Z.: "Liberals Join Nationalists Within ZChN"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The forming of a "shadow cabinet" within the Christian-National Union [ZChN] shows that a certain phase of conflict has come to an end. Heads of "ministries" or program commissions, apart from politicians closely tied to Wieslaw Chrzanowski and Ryszard Czarnecki, include hitherto oppositionists within the party: Marek Jurek, Marian Pilka, Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, Henryk Goryszewski. "I am already being criticized for gluing the party together, but I want a broad agreement," says acting party president Czarnecki.*

It is difficult to say at present whether the alliance between the liberal faction (headed by acting president Czarnecki) and the nationalists (led by Marek Jurek) will last. It was formed for very specific, currently vital, reasons—to prevent a "Walesazation" of the party. "It is hardly surprising that the rightist politicians who want to put up one mutual presidential candidate are cooperating," says Ryszard Czarnecki, although he believes the terms "alliance," "nationals," and "liberals" oversimplify the situation.

To Avoid Becoming the President's Clients

"Both the liberals and the nationalists have been recently disturbed by the latest activities of Henryk Goryszewski, head of the State Security Office, and the resolutions he inspired in several regional party organizations voicing support for Lech Walesa," a ZChN activist from the nationalist camp tells RZECZPOSPOLITA. There is no tendency within the ZChN to form an anti-Belweder bloc, but the party does want to avoid a situation in which the party would become a "client" for the president. "It would be best if there were one presidential candidate put forth by the entire right, by the Alliance for Poland, the 11 November Agreement, and Solidarity, and if that candidate had the blessing of the church. We must, however, provide for a more pessimistic scenario. Were we to fail to find such a candidate, we could not exclude the possibility of supporting Walesa or at least remaining neutral to his candidacy," our speaker tells us.

Not To Alienate Goryszewski

The first outcome of the alliance between the liberals and the nationalists was the distribution of "portfolios" in the shadow cabinet. At a suggestion made by Ryszard Czarnecki, Henryk Goryszewski became head of the Defense Commission. "I would not like certain options within the party to become alienated," Czarnecki explains.

Not included in the "cabinet," however, was Jan Piatkowski, former minister of justice, who is considered to be a potential candidate of Walesa's supporters for ZChN president. Party members advocating the ZChN's support for the president also mention the name of Miroslaw Jakubowski, former secretary general. Jan Lopuszanski remains a faithful supporter of Lech Walesa; the possibility of his becoming a candidate for party president at the congress scheduled for January cannot be ruled out.

The nationalists support Ryszard Czarnecki's "foreign policy" within the Alliance for Poland—namely, his attitude in the conflict concerning Romuald Szeremietiew. The alliance of nationalists and liberals did not establish any staff policy for the elections to be held at the coming congress. Czarnecki declares he will try to bring together all of the factions within the ZChN. He hopes this will be reflected in the party leadership—"proportionally, of course, to significance in the party and historical merits," says the party leader.

Chrzanowski's Shoes

Ryszard Czarnecki is mentioned among liberals as a candidate for party president (although there are also voices that Wieslaw Chrzanowski should return). The nationalists would like the president to be Marek Jurek, the faction leader, or Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, former deputy minister of education, considered to be one of the most dynamic politicians in the party. It is rather unlikely that any other candidate, apart from those mentioned above, will be put forth by way of compromise. More probably, one of the factions will not put forth a candidate, especially because, after the congress, running the party is to become more collective, and it will be possible to balance the power of the president in the Supervisory Council, for instance. "No one has a chance of standing in Wieslaw Chrzanowski's shoes," ZChN members say.

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Union of Freedom's Tusk Interviewed

MM1111142094 Krakow GAZETA KRAKOWSKA in Polish 20 Oct 94 p 3

[Interview with Donald Tusk, Union of Freedom deputy chairman, by correspondent Katarzyna Janowska; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Janowska] In an interview you gave me six months ago, you said that it would be necessary to wait several months for a true integration between former Democratic Union [UD] and Liberal Democratic Congress [KLD] members. Can we state with confidence today that the integration process is complete?

[Tusk] We can, and, to be frank, it is one of the few goals we have been able to reach easily within the range of objectives pursued by the Union of Freedom. I am not competent to discuss the local scene in Krakow, but, on the nationwide scale, there have been no major problems with integrating these two groups into one. The unification process went very smoothly, even to the extent of surpassing our expectations, especially in the milieus grouping younger activists from both parent parties. To anticipate your next question, in my opinion the present problems troubling the Union of Freedom are unconnected with the unification process as such. A major proportion of the animosities, conflicts, and differences of opinion that have filtered through and attracted public attention represent a legacy inherited from the former UD.

[Janowska] You said that the UD-KLD unification process went very smoothly. A number of spiteful, or perhaps disillusioned, individuals maintain that it was altogether too smooth: The Liberals have been absorbed virtually without a trace into the Union of Freedom, and, as regards Donald Tusk, who is still floating on the surface, it is not quite clear whether he is more a Liberal or a Unionist.

[Tusk] Even at the time of unification, I could already see that there were excessive and unrealistic expectations with regard to the Liberals' role in the new party. Many people, even including some coming from the former UD, hoped that the former KLD members would be able to impose the KLD's political style on the new party and that that style would gradually dominate in the Union of Freedom political profile. However, there are certain realities that cannot be overcome even with the best intentions on each side. This is why the dynamism and originality of the Liberals do not make up the dominant strain in the Union of Freedom; instead, the proportions established on 19 September 1993 still set the political tone.

Large-scale politics, which are, of course, highlighted in all of the national media and that promote specific styles of political action, concentrate around the government and the Sejm—and there are no Liberals there. In any case, the KLD was the smaller party, and that was bound to have negative consequences. But we are certainly not talking of a lost cause. Even so, we will need plenty of time before former KLD activists and, generally speaking, members of the younger political generation begin to set the tone and the style of our political mores. I believe that the situation will begin to change after April—that is, after the 2d Union of Freedom Congress. The younger generation should by then begin to set a definitive new tone for the party as a whole.

[Janowska] The merger between the two parties was supposed to bring them more extensive public support. However, judging from public opinion surveys, the Union of Freedom's popularity appears to be decreasing. At present, it can count on no more than about 8 percent of supporting votes.

[Tusk] You could say, in jest, that, because both UD and the KLD always enjoyed higher ratings in public opinion survey results than in eventual election results, things will perhaps turn out to be exactly the opposite now. However, that would not be a serious answer. I believe there is a high threshold of expectations set for the Union of Freedom by its sympathizers, especially those who are actively involved in public life—like, for example, journalists. Both its parent parties were previously favorites with the media, and that situation caused the excessive public expectations from the united party. I warned my colleagues not to expect that unification would yield us the combined sum of the two voter groups. To begin with, it was inevitable that we would suffer a popularity drop. There were groups of radical UD and KLD sympathizers who would never approve the two parties' merger. I would not unduly dramatize the public opinion survey results. I am aware of the popular inclination to watch and widely report those surveys that give the lowest popularity ratings to the Union of Freedom. Recently, two parallel opinion poll results were reported in the press. One gave the Union of Freedom 13 percent, while the other maintained that only 8 percent of respondents supported it. The first result was widely ignored. In my opinion, the public requirement for the kind of party represented by the Union of Freedom has not diminished at all. On the contrary, it should grow, and, in the future, it can be expected to give the Union the support of some 15-20 percent of the voting population. The problem is how to persuade our potential electorate to support us.

[Janowska] If the deputy chairman of a major party declares that his group is not able to meet social expectations, it is surely not a good sign, is it?

[Tusk] We are not able to meet these expectations because we are still not approaching the world of politics in a professional way. This particularly applies to the whole sphere of communication between political parties and society. Just like UD in its time, the Union of Freedom suffers from the absence of a clear and intelligible image. The average recipient of political canvassing will have tremendous difficulties in defining the Union

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of Freedom's aims. The problem is not that we do not know what we want but that we cannot communicate what we want to the public in simple terms, nor even in vastly simplified terms, terms simplified to such an extent that they are, in effect, trivialized.

[Janowska] So perhaps this is your chance now. Please tell us, in simple, or even vastly simplified and trivialized, terms what the Union of Freedom is all about.

[Tusk] (Thinks a while) It is likely that several groups within the Union of Freedom have a different view on this fundamental question. But, seriously, our name in itself defines our party's objectives to a certain extent. However, freedom is not a politically attractive commodity at this moment. The Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], and the Union of Labor [UP] are, in their different ways, parties that offer clear-cut and lucid social proposals. They guarantee or pretend that they are able to guarante a certain degree of social protection on the part of the state. On the other hand, the Union of Freedom should be able to convince people that desocialization of the economic and social spheres will bring positive results not only for those who are already managing reasonably well in the free market economy, but also for those whose life and livelihood today depend entirely on the state.

[Janowska] There is much talk nowadays about an identity crisis in the Union of Freedom. We have known for a long time that there are internal conflicts in the party, but, recently, the case of [Union of Freedom Sejm deputy] Barbara Labuda galvanized public opinion to an unusual extent. It was definitely a first case of that kind in your party. What lies at the root of the crisis?

[Tusk] If I wanted to answer your question in any depth, I would have to analyze each particular case for hours on end. Of course, it would be possible to simplify matters quite spectacularly and say that Barbara Labuda's case illustrated the fact that there are fundamental ideological divisions within the Union of Freedom. But, then, other examples of such divisions could be listed ad infinitum. As regards that particular case, I do not know a single person in the Union of Freedom, including even Wladyslaw Frasyniuk, Labuda's friend from Wroclaw, who would not take a skeptical view of the stance that Sejm Deputy Labuda repeatedly adopted in respect of her own party. No one doubts that Labuda frequently breached the requirement of party loyalty and the limits imposed by the requirement of party discipline, which is, after all, essential to the functioning of any political party. The problem seems to lie more in the choice of the method of dealing with the problem. In my opinion, there are really two serious problems in the Union of Freedom. The first is the excessive emphasis on party authority in relation to the work that should be carried out on an ongoing basis. There is a large group of senior Union of Freedom activists, people who are not just party luminaries but genuine eminent activists, who are nonetheless, owing to their past experience, accustomed to a completely different style of party work to the one needed today. Our activists, especially those who were previously involved in executive party authorities, find it very difficult to understand that the Union of Freedom today needs something different from a party cabinet, an idealistic concept, or the ability to maneuver various political affairs in the interest of strategic victories. What it needs is hard work with its potential electorate. Younger members who came from both the KLD and UD understand this need perfectly. So, in a sense, we have a generation conflict here. I believe that it will be resolved in a positive way to the advantage of the Union of Freedom's younger contingent as early as Apr 1.

[Janowska] Are you planning an overthrow of the party leadership?

[Tusk] A change in the party leadership is sure to take place during the congress, in any case, because that is envisaged in our constitution. I believe that, in April, the Union of Freedom leadership will definitely see fundamental changes. However, the personal composition of the power structure is not the most important thing here. It is not really essential that Mazowiecki, Geremek, Tusk, and Bielecki keep their positions, but it is essential that, beginning in April, the generation of 40-year-olds should dictate the party's pace and style.

[Janowska] What is the second-most-important problem facing the Union of Freedom today?

[Tusk] There is a bad tendency in the Union whereby people who have been losing their positions within the party attempt to "bite back" at it in public. I have no idea whether it will be possible to avert this tendency because it is something that has gained a firm foothold in people's attitudes. But people must come to realize that, once they join a political party, they must be prepared to give up some of their views and attitudes consciously and willingly.

[Janowska] Do you believe that the creation of the Democratic Forum attests to an identity crisis in the Union of Freedom? In your opinion, is it a potential precursor of a split within the party?

[Tusk] Let me tell you, not for propaganda reasons but as my own, sincere view, that I believe that the creation of the Forum does not bring with it even a shadow of a threat of a potential split. More likely, its emergence is an expression of the frustration felt by many people. They are frustrated also because they believe that their positions in the party are not as prominent as they should be. This concerns primarily the group involved with the former socioliberal faction. But there are also those among the organizers of the Democratic Forum who simply could not think of a better way to galvanize the Union of Freedom into action. However, that is not a particularly fortunate idea, especially for those people who, in a way, position themselves against their own party. Even so, not one of them is actually going to leave the party. I am at times amused by the fact that there are people who are not too fond of their party but will

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nonetheless continue to stick with it. On the other hand, that does not surprise me. According to criteria the Union of Freedom generally considers to be of major importance, it is currently the best party in Poland.

[Janowska] During a meeting at the Journalists' Club "Pod Gruszka," you said that the Union of Freedom's right and left wings are highly visible despite the fact that, owing to the respective groups' numerical strength, they are not particularly significant within the party. On the other hand, while the center group is indeed large, it does not have a definite profile because it lacks relevant structures. Can that statement of yours be interpreted as advance notification of the creation of a Center Forum?

[Tusk] God forbid. I simply wish to insist that the center group constitutes the true Union of Freedom. The party organization gives it the necessary structure. I would not have the slightest objection to the advocates of the extreme having a high profile within the party, provided the party's true voice is just as audible and just as dynamic. I am interested in making sure that the Union of Freedom's power, politics, and pronouncements correspond to the ideas held by the party's true majority. And the true majority in the Union of Freedom is moderate, liberal in its economic concepts, and temperate as regards questions of ideology and program. That temperate majority is represented in the Union by Tadeusz Mazowiecki. But that is not enough to counterbalance the occasionally extravagant utterances, at times qualifying to be termed excesses, on the part of those who do not represent the Union of Freedom's overwhelming temperate majority. But this, too, is very likely to change in April.

[Janowska] Much is being said nowadays about a possible alliance between the Union of Freedom and the SLD. How realistic are these speculations?

[Tusk] This is a kind of media conspiracy, in which the media are attempting to link us forcibly to the SLD. Very important papers that exert very strong influence on public opinion are involved in this campaign. They are GAZETA WYBORCZA, POLITYKA, and WPROST. These papers are the ones most often read by our voters. They promote the myth that the government coalition is made up of the "good" SLD and the "bad" PSL, with the latter doing all it can to bring the positive transformations to a halt. That is not true. Both parties are responsible in similar measure for the fact that no sensible progress has been achieved in Poland for the past year. Moreover, results of public opinion surveys speak directly against such attempts to court the voters. They suggest clearly that our sympathizers would give such politicians as Kwasniewski [SLD] no support at all if he were to run for president. Union of Freedom voters are consciously anti-SLD. And I am convinced that, contrary to a view that is currently gaining widespread public support, it is not Lech Walesa who represents the most serious threat to democracy. What the PSL and the SLD are doing in their neat manner and in compliance with the laws in force is, in the long run, more dangerous than even the most controversial of the president's maneuverings. Despite the fact that we recently took Lech Walesa to task in parliament, we are well aware of these proportions.

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Paper Notes General Officer Promotions

AU0211085894 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 25 Oct 94 p 3

[Report by Radu Tudor: "Ion Iliescu Made 10 Generals"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] On Monday, 24 October, in the presence of Romania's president and of the minister of national defense, the ceremony of promotion of certain generals, as well as to grant the rank of major general to certain colonels, took place at Cotroceni Palace. [passage omitted]

Nine Were Promoted From Major General to Lieutenant General

Nicolae Schiopu, deputy of the chief of the Armed Forces General Staff [St.M.G.]; Raul Buliga, deputy of the St.M.G. chief; Ionita Botos, logistics command chief; Mihaita Costache, operations administration chief; Radu Gheorghe, first deputy of the St.M.G. chief; Dorin Gheorghiu, chief of the 4th "Transylvanian" Army general staff; Ilie Marin, 1st Army commander; Nicolae Pastinica, 2nd Army commander; Florentin Popa, chief of the Armed Forces Supplies Department.

Ten Were Promoted From the Rank of Colonel to Major General

Ion Magdalena, secretary of the Supreme Defense Council of Romania; Gheorghe Rotaru, chief of the Political-Military Analysis Department; Gheorghe Georgescu, chief of the Signal Corps, Electronic Data Processing, and Electronics Command; Nicolae Corduneanu, chief of the Multilateral Treaties administration; Constantin Vertan, chief of the Supplies Department Planning and Coordination administration; Costica Buga of the St.M.G.; Traian Ceteras of the Navy general staff; Gheorghe Constantin of the Air Force and Antiaircraft Defense general Staff; Alexandru Dascal of the St.M.G.; and Marin Lulache of the St.M.G.

Ministry Conveys to Russia Position on Treaties

AU0211133294 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 2 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has conveyed to the embassy of the Russian Federation in Bucharest a verbal message in which it reiterates Romania's position vis-a-vis the Romanian-Soviet Treaty of 1970. The message specifies that the document in question, now null and void, is of no further relevance to Romania's relations with the Russian Federation or with any other successor state of the former Soviet Union. Consequently, the possibility of in any way maintaining or prolonging its validity does not arise—said Mrs. Simona Miculescu, foreign ministry deputy spokeswoman, at today's news conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Also, in its message, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated that the the Romanian Government is fully ready to conclude a basic political treaty with the Russian Federation, in keeping with the new political conditions prevailing in the two countries and in Europe, as well as with the policies followed by both Romania and the Russian Federation in recent years.

'Fascism' of Political Elites Protested

LD01?1203994 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 1 Nov 94

[Report by Bucharest correspondent Tibor Bogdan]

[FBIS Translated Text] Arpad Marton, deputy leader of the HDUR [Hungarian Democratic Union in Romania] group of deputies, has rebuffed anti-Hungarian outbursts by Cluj-Napoca [Kolozsvar] mayor Gheorghe Funar and other Romanian politicians. Tibor Bogdan, our Bucharest correspondent, is on the line.

[Bogdan] Arpad Marton, deputy leader of the HDUR group of deputies in the Romanian Parliament, has voiced his protest against anti-Hungarian manifestations by top people among the Romanian powers-that-be. He said this today, making an unscheduled statement in the House of Deputies of the Romanian parliament.

The statement was prompted by a threat to the effect that Hungary could easily become an ancient Romanian land, i.e. a province of Romania, were the leadership in Budapest to put its paws on Romanian territories again. The threat was made in an interview by Gheorghe Funar, vice president [title as heard] of the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR]. The PUNR is a member of the ruling coalition.

Funar described the Hungarian people and the Hungarian minority in Romania as an uncultivated horde driven by nomadic and barbaric instincts, whose 1,000 year-old delusion [that Transylvania is part of Hungary] must be cured by Romanians.

In connection with Funar's remarks, Marton warned that before this, President Iliescu made anti-Hungarian statements in Strasbourg. So did, in an interview, Oliviu Gherman, honorary president of the Social Democracy Party of Romania, a party that is also a member of the ruling coalition. Gherman is also president of the Romanian Senate.

It is time Romania's political class gives serious thought to this, said Marton—because promulgating the inferiority or superiority of peoples and lecturing people is fascism, stressed Marton in his speech in the Romanian parliament.

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Akashi 'Adamantly' Opposes Lifting Arms Embargo

AU0111215094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 1 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Yasushi Akashi is adamantly opposed to the lifting of the arms embargo for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government. This is what Akashi said in Zagreb tonight after talks with Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency member Ejup Ganic that took place in the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] headquarters. Nada al-Isa reports.

[Al-Isa] Dr. Ganic warned that it was necessary to lift the embargo, because this was the only way to force the aggressor to talk about peace. There can be no peace without a balance of power, stressed Ganic. However, Akashi claims that the lifting of the embargo would fuel the combat and cause UNPROFOR's withdrawal, which would in turn cause a humanitarian catastrophe in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nevertheless, Yasushi Akashi in today's talks insisted that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army should withdraw from Mt. Igman.

Dr. Ganic said that the Army would withdraw as soon as UNPFOROR secures a safe passage over Mt. Igman for humanitarian aid. Akashi promised that UNPROFOR would do everything possible, since it is well-known that the situation in Sarajevo is already critical and that winter is approaching. Akashi promised that all problems—at least the basic ones—would be solved before winter.

Bihac was also discussed in this context. According to what Ganic and Akashi told reporters, a new airdrop operation would probably be organized for Bihac as there is no other alternative because the aggressor is not allowing humanitarian convoys through to Bihac. Dr. Ganic furthermore stressed that a preventive action by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army was currently in progress on the Bihac front aimed a thwarting the aggressor's intentions. However, not even the current fierce aggressor attacks—on Bihac for example—were enough to convince Akashi that it was necessary to lift the arms embargo for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government.

Gen Rose Letter to Mladic Urges 'Restraint'

MS0211105594 London THE TIMES in English 2 Nov 94 p 15

[Report by Eve-Ann Prentice: "Rose Letter Informs Serbs He Wants To Avoid Airstrikes"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The tone of a letter from Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Rose, commander of the United Nations troops in Bosnia, to General Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serb military commander, is likely to cause outrage in Washington, widen the rift between NATO and the UN, and renew Bosnian government calls for the British general's resignation.

The letter, obtained by THE TIMES, will be interpreted as demonstrating General Rose's reluctance to call for NATO airstrikes against the Bosnian Serbs, an attitude diametrically opposite to NATO's demands for tougher action. "I would like to confirm that the UN always regrets the need to use force in its peacekeeping mission," General Rose says. "As commander BH (Bosnia-Herzegovina) Command, I fully agree with you that we must, in the future, avoid all situations which necessitate the use of force, whether it be applied from the ground or the air." The letter, dated September 30, also asks for closer liaison and co-operation between the Bosnian Serbs and UN peacekeepers.

The reaffirmation of General Rose's reluctance to call airstrikes will increase friction between Washington and NATO, and the fact that his reluctance is made clear in a letter to the Bosnian Serb military chief is certain to further alienate the Muslim-led Bosnian Government. These strains come at a perilous time in Bosnia, with fighting threatening to spill back into Croatia, with Serbs there threatening to support their Bosnian brethren in the face of a surge by Muslim-led troops around Bihac, near the Croatian border.

The rebel Serbs in Croatia have massed their forces and threatened to advance into northwest Bosnia, UN observers said yesterday. About 2,000 Serb soldiers from the Krajina region have been mobilised since Bosnian Government troops broke out of the mainly Muslim enclave of Bihac last week and smashed deep into Bosnian Serb territory. The government troops have overrun nearly 100 square miles in their onslaught.

General Rose has in the past called for NATO to consider airstrikes against Bosnian Muslims as well as against the Serbs, and his letter to General Mladic was disclosed as it became clear that Washington is vehemently opposed to this. Warren Christopher, the American Secretary of State, yesterday rejected a suggestion by General Rose that Nato warplanes might attack Bosnian Government forces.

The policy of keeping "safe havens" clear of conflict applies equally to the mostly Muslim army as well as to the Serbs, but Mr Christopher said "we don't see any occasion for it at the present time", because the United States still considered the Bosnian Serbs the main aggressors in the war.

Although General Rose wants to be able to call airstrikes against all sides in the conflict if necessary, he is opposed to any large-scale increase in NATO action because he fears for the safety of peacekeepers on the ground and worries that more outside intervention in the Balkan conflict may destroy delicate and complicated international diplomatic efforts to forge a negotiated settlement. In his letter, General Rose urges restraint on General Mladic. He writes: "If our troops are deliberately engaged by fire, then we have to respond, no matter who it was that opened fire. I am sure that as a soldier you will understand this point of view.

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"These are difficult times for everyone, and we must not allow local tactical-level incidents to undermine the road to peace. I urge you now to give orders accordingly." The letter is signed by hand, "Yours sincerely, Michael Rose".

Colonel Tim Spicer, spokesman for General Rose, said in Sarajevo last night: "I am not prepared to discuss the whys and wherefores of why the letter was sent. It is a letter written privately to General Mladic."

In a separate letter to THE TIMES today, General Rose emphasises that the UN mission in Bosnia is "principally one of peacekeeping, not peace enforcement". He says that Bosnia is "fast returning to reality", and that "injudicious use of force would take the mission across that line which divides peace from war".

Russia last night called for measures to halt the government-led attacks on Serbs around Bihac. The attack by Bosnian forces is "a challenge to the UN" which "shows that the Muslims have decided to resolve the conflict by arms", Grigoriy Karasin, a Foreign Ministry spokesman, said in Moscow. "It would be catastrophic if nothing were done to stop it."

In Bonn, Germany's chief prosecutor was quoted as saying that the authorities are investigating 51 Serbs accused of war crimes in former Yugoslavia.

If the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal in The Hague asks to take over the cases, Germany is likely to grant the request, although first it will have to amend its laws, Kay Nehm, the chief prosecutor, said in an interview with STERN. The magazine said that all 51 suspects were ethnic Serbs, but did not say if they were all Bosnian Serbs.

Gen Rose Discusses UN Mission in Bosnia

MS0211104194 London THE TIMES in English 2 Nov 94 p 19

[Letter from Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose, Commander Bosnia-Herzegovina Command, in Sarajevo: "Prime Mission of UN in Bosnia"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sir, Your leading article today headed "UN irresolution" is so seriously flawed that I feel bound to reply in order to put the record straight. Such a correction may also cause you to modify your call for a greater degree of enforcement to be used in the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia.

Much of your argument revolves around differences between NATO and the UN regarding the use of air power and reveals a total misunderstanding of the true nature of the debate. The mandate, and therefore the mission, is principally one of peacekeeping, not peace enforcement. The primary mission of the UN in Bosnia remains that of assisting UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies to sustain the lives of millions of suffering people in the midst of a war.

It is not within the mandate or capability of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] to impose a military solution on the country. Injudicious use of force would take the mission across the line which divides peace from war. This would hazard the lives of not only those engaged on the peacekeeping mission, but the mission as a whole.

If this happened, the enclaves of eastern Bosnia would fall, Sarajevo would return to the horrors of the last two winters and the future of the Croat Muslim Federation would be put into doubt.

First, it was not in February 1994 but in August 1993 that the secretary general of NATO first committed his air forces in support of the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo. At that time it was decided that air power would only be called for by UNPROFOR as a last resort.

This use of force would act mainly as a deterrent and would follow all the normal principles for the use of force in any peacekeeping operation. Force used was to be limited to that necessary to achieve a specific aim. Effort would be made to avoid collateral damage, and strong warnings would be given where possible.

These principles continue to provide the guidance for both air and ground commanders involved in Bosnia, although there have inevitably been some subsequent adjustments to the original co-ordinating arrangements that were established at that time.

Since August 1993, the support given by NATO to the UN mission in Bosnia has been indispensable to the success of the peacekeeping mission as the presence of air power has ensured that UN Security Council resolutions and other agreements are backed by credible force.

To dismiss the destruction of an M18 tank destroyer and T55 tank by airpower as a pinprick or signifying apparent paralysis is to confuse peacekeeping with warfighting. It is interesting to note that if no warning had been given in the latter air strike a number of children who were playing around that tank would have been killed. This would not have been in the interests of NATO or the people of this country.

Meanwhile, it is not the case that Sarajevo is without utilities. Gas, electricity and water are currently running at an all-time high. Trams run daily. Nor is it the case that Bosnian Serb shelling has resumed in the way implied. Indeed the only serious case of shelling within the Sarajevo exclusion zone since the airport agreement of February 9, 1994, was carried out by government forces.

Aid continues to reach those in need and, more importantly, central Bosnia is fast returning to normality, with the numbers of those dependent on aid signficantly decreasing.

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All this is being done because of the tireless and often hazardous work of many thousands of young men and women who have been voluntarily contributed by 16 different nations. It is not right that their work should be undermined by ill-informed comment.

Reportage on Military Situation in Republic

'Fierce Fighting' in Bihac

AU0111120794 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 1 Nov 94

[Report by Muhamed Mulic from Bihac]

[FBIS Translated Text] There is again fierce fighting against joint aggressor forces in the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina 5th Corps theater of operations today, especially around the newly attained defense lines. Coordinated artillery attacks from the UNPA's [UN Protection Areas] in the so-called Serbian Krajina in Croatia have also continued. The target of these attacks are the newly liberated territories, especially the populated settlements of Ripac, Golubic, Cukovi, Orasac, and Kulen Vakuf. These attacks are carried out from the Donji Lapac commune, where the enemy army has been observed concentrating its forces and bringing in military hardware.

The Velika Kladusa commune has not been spared shelling from the UNPA's in the so-called Serbian Krajina either. In addition to substantial material damage, a number of civilians were also wounded.

In the General Staff of the Croatian Defense Council for the Bihac region's theater of operations, the joint aggressors again shelled the heart of the defense lines and the village of Stocaj with 120-mm mortars from the direction of Melinovac and Zeljezno Polje. In the region of (?Petrovo) Selo, the enemy was observed amassing troops.

In the newly liberated areas, the care of which is now in the hands of a special committee set up by Bihac Mayor Adnan Alagic, measures are being taken to set all government and communal services in motion.

Due to constant attacks from the UNPA's in the so-called Krajina in Croatia, the military and civilian authorities have sent fresh protests to UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] in Zagreb, saying that these attacks amounted to open aggression from the territory of another country.

Serbs Recapture Positions

LD0111133794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1304 GMT 1 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Petrovac, 1 Nov (TANJUG)—In fighting on the southern section of the Bihac front, the Srpska republic army has recaptured part of the territory temporarily seized by the 5th Corps eight days ago, Serb military sources announced today. According to the same sources, members of the 5th Corps have been attacking Serb positions on the Bihac-Krupa front for nine days. The sources note that the enemy continues the deployment of sabotage-terrorist groups to break through the Serb defense lines. Four such groups have been pushed back to their initial positions, and two were liquidated while attempting to cross the Una River.

Serb sources state that 60 Muslim soldiers were killed and a large number wounded at one location alone.

It is relatively quiet on Kupres front today following yesterday's action, when 15 artillery rounds of various calibers fired from the Muslim strongholds of Suljaga and Osmanagina Kosa hit Serb territory.

Serb sources note that earlier today there were no Muslim infantry attacks in the areas of Demirovac and Lepoglava, the scene of heavy fighting yesterday.

Serbs 'Crushing' Offensive

LD0111233894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2257 GMT 1 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin, Sipovo, 1 Nov (TANJUG)—Units of the Srpska republic army [VRS] are successfully crushing the Muslim offensive in the area of the so-called Bihac pocket and have already passed through Kulen Vakuf, ISKRA reported this evening.

VRS units are continuing their operations, ISKRA reports, citing the information service of the main headquarters of the Serb army of Krajina, which announced this information received from the command of the VRS 2d Krajina Corps.

SRNA reported this evening that Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic, declared in Sipovo that "Serb forces have embarked on the final stage of the war in former Bosnia-Herzegovina."

In a statement for Srpska radio and television, Karadzic said that it is "evident the Muslims want war" and that the Srpska army would have to, he said, "defeat them militarily."

UN: Heavy Fighting Continues

AU0211093894 Paris AFP in English 0901 GMT 2 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Nov 2 (AFP)—Heavy fighting continued in northwest Bosnia Wednesday, with much of the action taking place around the town of Bosanska Krupa, a UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] spokesman said here.

In Sarajevo, a Ukrainian soldier serving with the UN was found dead early Wednesday near a Serb-weapons collection point at Ilidza. There were no immediate details on the cause of death, UNPROFOR Major Herve Gourmelon said.

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The Bosnian Government and separatist Serbs have each claimed military successes, with government forces saying they had taken some 50 square kilometres (20 square miles) of territory southeast of Sarajevo over the past four days.

At least five Bosnian Government soldiers were killed in an infantry assault Tuesday afternoon north on the Serb-held town of Bosanska Krupa which Moslem forces are attempting to seize, Gourmelon said. And heavy mortar and artillery exchanges continued further north around Otoka.

There was heavy shelling of the Moslem-held locality of Miostrah, and at least nine shells, fired from neighbouring Croatia's Serb-held Krajina region, fell on the town of Velika Kladusa Tuesday, wounding one child.

North of Bosanska Krupa, a UN Bangladeshi unit was temporarily forced to withdraw after four shells narrowly missed its observation post.

In the north of the country, there was heavy Serb shelling overnight of the Gradacac sector, along with fighting near Doboj. No details were released.

Questioned about the current upsurge in fighting in Bosnia and the latest Bosnian Moslem counter-offensive, British Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind stressed in Washington Tuesday there was no evidence that any of the factions could achieve a fundamental change of position by escalating the fighting.

The Bosnian Serbs have rejected a proposed peace plan put forward by the Contact Group—Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States.

Serbs Target 5th Corps, HVO

AU0211121694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 2 Nov 94

[Report by Muhamed Mulic from the Bihac front]

[FBIS Translated Text] Fierce fighting against the joint aggressor forces is continuing today on the front lines in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 5th Corps theater of operations. Our army's newly achieved positions—which are under the full control of 5th Corps joint units—are coming under enemy attack. The liberated areas are under constant fire from the UN Protection Areas [UNPA] in the so-called Serbian Krajina in Croatia. For example, from the territory of the Donji Lapac municipality, the enemy is shelling Kulen Vakuf, Orasak, Cukovic, and other villages and hamlets in this part of the Bihac municipality. Villages in and around Cazin are also being exposed to attacks. The joint aggressors are also targeting Velika Kladusa, parts of which are also under constant fire from the UNPA zones in the so-called Krajina.

In the theater of operations of the Croatian Defense Council's [HVO] Main Headquarters for the Bihac region, the aggressor is not giving up his offensive activity against the front lines and civilian facilities. The enemy fired some 100 mortar shells at (?Veliki Focaj) and attempted to break through the defenses, but was pushed back to his initial positions. In the region of Zeljava, the HVO and 5th Corps defense lines came under attack from the direction of Licko Petrovo Selo in the so-called Krajina. The defenders did not respond to these attacks.

Karadzic Threatens Deserters

AU0111181694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 1 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Around 200 members of Karadzic's paramilitary forces that have fled Bosnia to the occupied Croatian areas in order to avoid (?armed conflicts) have caused veritable chaos in the so-called republic of Serbian Krajina. In the meantime, more deserters are arriving. This is confirmed by the panicky newscasts of the Serbian radio stations in the occupied areas. Nada al-Isa reports from Zagreb.

[Al-Isa] According to reports broadcast by the Serbian radio stations in the occupied Croatian areas, it is possible to deduce that all the soldiers under arms are trying to take the law into their hands. The seriousness of the situation is confirmed by the fact that Radio Knin and [name indistinct] are constantly repeating Radovan Karadzic's warning threatening to shoot anyone who fails to comply with the rules of the proclaimed state of war. According to the UN Protection Forces, the Serbian soldiers continue to flee Bosnia to occupied Croatian areas, and it is likely that several hundred, rather than just 200 troops, have crossed into Croatia. Those that have so far not been mobilized are also fleeing in order to avoid the Bihac front.

Milan Martic, president of the so-called Serbian Krajina, is attempting to help Karadzic raise his troops' morale and is using Radio Knin to claim that Milosevic has personally promised him that he would never recognize either Croatia or Bosnia in their internationally recognized borders and that the so-called Serb lands would unite. However, there has been no confirmation that a single soldier has returned to the Bihac front after hearing these promises and that he has regained his fighting spirit. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that they will regain their fighting spirit after having seen for themselves that the 5th Corps has completely defeated them in every offensive since February.

NATO Planes Buzz Srebrenica

AU0111121894 Paris AFP in English 1150 GMT 1 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Nov 1 (AFP)—NATO planes buzzed Serb forces near the Moslem-held enclave of Srebrenica, in eastern Bosnia, after they fired at UN Protection Force soldiers, a UNPROFOR spokesman said Tuesday.

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Major Herve Gourmelon said Serb forces fired at a Dutch UN patrol Monday afternoon and then fired from one of their bunkers at a UN observation post.

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) planes overflew the area, but Serb forces opened fire again at the observation post after they left, Gourmelon said.

None of the UN soldiers was injured.

UN: Muslims Deploy SAM's

AU0111130694 Paris AFP in English 1237 GMT 1 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Nov 1 (AFP)—Bosnian Government forces Tuesday deployed SAM-7 anti-aircraft weapons and a heavy mortar in a demilitarized zone (DMZ) outside Sarajevo, a UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) spokesman said here.

The deployment in the southern part of the Mount Igman DMZ—outside the total heavy weapon exclusion zone—came despite renewed undertakings Monday by Bosnian commanders that their soldiers would pull out from the greater part of the DMZ Monday [31 October] night.

"Yesterday they left, and this morning they came back" with one heavy mortar and four shoulder-fired SAM-7 weapons, Major Herve Gourmelon said.

Meanwhile an offensive by Bosnian Government forces to the immediate east of the Igman DMZ continued with government forces apparently progressing towards a Serb-held road they can now shell.

Government forces, under pressure from the UN, had reluctantly agreed to evacuate positions held in the DMZ, but many of the troops have stayed put, while others have been playing cat-and-mouse with UN forces inside the zone.

The UN Protection Force this weekend accused the Bosnians of firing howitzers at its observation posts in the DMZ and threatened to call in air strikes if this happened again.

But in Washington, State Department spokeswoman Christine Shelly said Monday it was highly unlikely the United States would participate in a NATO air strikes on Bosnian government forces.

"It's, I think, hard to imagine the U.S. participating in that kind of an action against Bosnian government forces when they clearly have been the overwhelming victim in the aggression," she said.

Muslims Active on Sarajevo Front

LD0111231294 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2308 GMT 1 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Nov. 1 (TANJUG)—"Combat actions by the Muslim army on the Sarajevo front are constantly intensifying," Bosnian Serb army sources said Tuesday as quoted by the Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA.

Muslim forces on Tuesday evening opened small arms and sniper fire at Sarajevo's Serb suburb of Lukavica, SRNA said. Bosnian Muslims attacked Sarajevo's serb districts of Aerodrom, Nedzarici, Rajlovac, and Donji Kotorac with mortars and hand grenade launchers, SRNA said quoting the Serb army statement. The Vojkovici-Trnovo road, southeast of central Sarajevo, took the brunt of the attack, SRNA said.

The army statement said "Muslim units are again massing in the area of Kobilja Glava and 'Jezero' hospital, 3 km northwest of central Sarajevo."

Muslim military authorities are carrying out additional mobilization in the city of Sarajevo itself, the Bosnian Serb army statement said as carried by SRNA.

Croats Take Serb Strongholds

LD0111185794 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 1 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] On All Saints Day the Serbs launched a fierce artillery attack against Croat civilian targets in Suica, causing slight damage. Nevertheless, Croat Defense Council [HVO] units responded with a strong counterattack and destroyed two enemy tanks, military sources from the defense ministry of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna have disclosed.

HVO units have managed to capture several important Serb strongholds near the town of Kupres, where fighting is still raging on. The HVO did not suffer any casualties, while, according to available information, the Serb side has suffered considerable losses in manpower.

HVO Gains in Kupres

LD0211100394 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 2 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Following an artillery attack on Sujica, units of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO], in a counterattack, have captured a large part of the Kupres municipality under Serb occupation, including Mount Ravasnica and Ravanjska Vrata, thus freeing the Rama-Tomislavgrad road.

According to HABENA [Bosnian Croat news agency], Serb forces are in a state of panic after their sudden defeat, in which they lost a large number of soldiers from the occupied areas. Two tanks and two armored vehicles have been destroyed so far; one tank has been captured. HVO units continue to advance on Kupres.

1st Corps Liberates Areas

AU0111163394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 1 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In the context of extensive defensive and counteroffensive activities, and with the

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aim of preventing further enemy offensive activity, the joint units of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 1st Corps launched a counteroffensive in the course of which they decimated the enemy elite troops of the 1st Home Guard Motorized Brigade [words indistinct]. In the course of this action, over 100 members of the Guard were killed, close to 200 were incapacitated, and eight were taken prisoner. Over 50 square km of occupied territory was liberated, and our units have firmly fortified the newly liberated positions in the region of Vukovo Brdo, Crna Rijeka, (?Police), (?Ogorjeli Kuk), Lednici, Ovlik, Dubovi, Velika Jezera, Mali Ljeljan, Veliki Ljeljan, Bijeligrad, and (?Voluja Jama). We stress that the effects of our counteroffensive would be much greater had the UN Protection Forces not prevented our forces from infiltrating the area from the direction of Mt. Igman. Nevertheless, one of our subversion groups from the demilitarized zone managed to infiltrate the area of Troskok and liquidated the headquarters of the 3d Battalion of the 2d Sarajevo Infantry Brigade.

After a relative lull and after fortifying the newly achieved defense lines, the 1st Corps units aided by a part of the Interior Ministry units continued the counteroffensive and liberated [words indistinct] (?Luljeva Stijena), Glavice, the village of Raketnica, (?Selimina Glava), Liticna Glava, Kasic, Trebavice, Musno Brdo, Hojta, Zagon, Kamenito Brdo, Pandurice, Crvena Kosa, and (?Cilovec). The enemy lost some 70 to 80 troops in the battles, 26 of which were [word indistinct] on our side. In the latest counteroffensive the units of the 1st Corps liberated Siljak, Kocerin, the southwestern slopes of Troskok, Kuk, Osoj, Javor, Debelo Brdo, and Kukolji. The war spoils captured in recent days includes seven T-55 tanks, one self-propelled 122-mm gun, five armored personnel carriers, two 76-mm guns, one 76-mm gun, one 40-mm Bofors gun, two 20-mm anti-aircraft guns, one 120-mm mortar, five 12.7-mm anti-aircraft machine guns, three 60-mm mortars, six anti-aircraft missiles, seven trucks, one cistern, one bus, a great number of luxury cars, and large quantities of ammunition of all calibers.

First Corps commander Brigadier General Vahid Karavelic has ordered all the units participating in the counteroffensive in the area to treat the Serbian civilian population humanely, reports the 1st Corps Information Service. [passage omitted]

Artillery attacks continued this morning in the Celic municipality, but they were less intense. Movements of the aggressor troops and the arrival of manpower and equipment have been reported in the areas around all chetnik strongholds. New enemy offensive actions are expected. Apart from significant material damage, there were no other consequences.

Corps Commander on Successes

AU0111210294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 1 Nov 94

[Statement by Vahid Karavelic, Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 1st Corps commander, "made especially for Bosnia-Herzegovina Radio"; date not given—read by announcer]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] I would first of all like to stress that the political decision to lift the arms embargo on the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is currently topical. On this occasion, I have the honor of concluding on behalf of all members of the 1st Corps that the so-called Srpska republic has lifted the embargo for us and has given us a great amount of weapons, ammunition, and other equipment. In the past three days, the 1st Corps units launched a counteroffensive with the aim of liberating new areas on the Treskavica plateau, that is, on the Mt. Bjelasnica plateau.

By liberating a part of the territory in the Trnovo municipality, the 1st Corps units, in a brilliantly executed counterattack, in a matter of days liberated close to 100 square km of our territory. Following this, they captured immense quantities of weapons, technical equipment, ammunition, and other equipment. It is worth stressing the operational and tactical significance of several important points in the wider area between Treskavica and Mt. Bjelasnica—Siljak, Vidikovac, the village of Dujmovici, Ledici, and other key points that are of tactical, that is, operational significance in the area. [passage omitted]

At the moment, it is difficult to assess the number of prisoners taken, and the amount of ammunition and other equipment captured. I would like to use this occasion to congratulate all the other corps on their recent successes, and I would particularly like to join in the congratulations for our 5th and 7th Corps on the success they have had so far. I would also like to use this occasion to congratulate all the members of the 1st Corps, particularly those that have won this brilliant victory over the chetnik forces. We immediately turned all the captured equipment—tanks, personnel carriers, guns, and so forth—against the chetniks and we have been using them these past two days for liberating fresh areas, that is, new territories that I have mentioned earlier.

I would like to say to all the 1st Corps members that it is an honor and a pleasure to command such units, or as the old folk saying goes: It is easy to be a good commander when one has such good officers and soldiers.

Serbs Attack 2d Corps Area

AU0211101794

[FBIS Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 0900 GMT on 2 Nov carries in its regular 8-minute newscast several reports updating the continued fighting in the republic.

Gracanica correspondent Izudin Durakovic reports that "the chetniks are continuing with attacks on defense lines and residential areas in the 2d Operations Group of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 2d Corps theater of operations. In the evening hours, the enemy launched artillery attacks from several directions. Using 120-mm howitzers from [name indistinct] and guns from (?Lic),

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the chetniks pounded Klokotinica, [name indistinct], and Lukavica Rijeka. Some 70 shells landed in the area, inflicting immense material damage and wounding four people. The day was calmer on the Gracanica front. Apart from the usual small arms provocations, the chetniks used 120-mm mortars to shell Vis and Javor from the region of (?Kitnjak). On the Lukavica front, the chetniks throughout the day used anti-aircraft weapons on the defense lines. They also sporadically used recoilless guns from the region of Tuzno Brdo. There were no consequences."

Abdulah Hisanovic reports from the Kalesija front and says that "the killers yesterday made their presence known with dozens of destructive shells that pounded the entire area of the Kalesija municipality. From the early morning hours they used [words indistinct] to shell Kalesija Centar, causing immense material damage. Following this, they used anti-aircraft weapons to target the defense lines. In the afternoon, the enemy intensified his artillery attacks and first used 82-mm mortars from the stronghold in (?Zelila) to pound the Kalesija-(?Jajic) route. Only 15 minutes later, they opened fierce fire from the direction of [name indistinct]. They used 120-mm mortars to shell the entire free territory. At the same time, they used a multiple rocket launcher from the notorious stronghold in Rasel to fire several destructive shells that caused immense damage. Some time after 2000, a Bofors gun was used to shell Kalesija Centar and the Milanovci-Memici road. At 2135, the territory of the Zivinice municipality, particularly the area around Gornja Dubrava and [name indistinct] came under fierce howitzer fire from Gorohovo."

The Bosna Operations Group Press Center reports that "in the afternoon, the chetniks stepped up their attacks on the defenders and the free territory. Using 120-mm mortars, they targeted the wider area of Mahoj and Maglaj. The forward front lines in Posilovo came under intensified small arms fire at nightfall. Up until midnight, 82-mm mortars were used to sporadically shell residential areas in the region of Mahoj."

The studio announcer cites a report by the 1st Corps Information Service and says that "the chetniks fired three rifle grenades at Vrbanje; one mortar shell was fired at our positions in [name indistinct]."

Sarajevo Radio Roundup

AU0111202494

[FBIS Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1800 GMT on 1 Nov carries in its regular 37-minute newscast several reports updating the current military situation on fronts throughout the republic.

Visoko correspondent Salih Hadzialic reports that "at around 1530 extremely powerful detonations rocked the town. At that moment the chetniks from Trnac started a veritable artillery barrage using a T-12 gun, a tank, and heavy mortars aimed at the center and wider areas of Visoko. Over 20 heavy shells landed on the area within 15 minutes. One person was wounded and great damage was caused to residential buildings." Hadzialic goes on to say that "our defenders responded adequately to the chetnik artillery barrage, after which it stopped. At 1550 a general alarm was sounded in Visoko and it is still in effect. Our positions continue to be the target of the chetnik infantry and antiaircraft arms, particularly on the Visoko-Buci route."

The announcer cites a report by the 206th Chivalrous Zvornik Brigade Information Service and says that "1 Nov was marked by constant shelling of the forward front lines and residential areas. A T-55 tank from the hill in Androvici targeted Vitinica and Godus. Using an M-84 machine gun, the enemy from Pecine shelled Kraljevici, Trake, Sapna, and Kobilici."

Mirudin Aldobasic reports on the situation in the Teslic area and says that "the Teslic chetniks are not giving up on their intention to recapture the territories they recently lost. After futile attacks, the Serbian aggressor tried to surprise our defenders on other fronts in the 7 South Operations Group theater of operations. After failing in this attempt, he indiscriminately shelled the Doboj villages of Mravici and Matuzici. The demarcation lines in the 277th Tesanj Hill Brigade were also not spared."

An unidentified correspondent from the Srebrenica Press Center reports that "from their well-known stronghold on the (?Kvart) elevation, the enemy used antiaircraft and small arms to target the suburbs. Using anti-aircraft machine guns, snipers, and automatic weapons, the enemy from Caus, Zivlje near Bratunac, Kaolin, and Zagon targeted the area of Potocari, while the region of Zutica, Slatina, and (?Sastavaci) came under fierce machine gun fire from Velika Gradina and Koprsko Brdo."

The studio cites a 1st Corps Information Service report and says that "on the Sarajevo front today, the aggressor launched four mortar shells at Hrasnica. Small arms fire from Aerodromsko Naselje was opened at Dobrinja. The UN observers' building was also targeted by incendiary bullets. Small arms provocations were reported from Orlovaca and Titine Stijene at Lisicnjak, and from Cavrkova Stijena, Faletici, and Zecja Glava at our defense lines. An antiaircraft machine gun from the direction of Brezik targeted Hladivode, Trliste, and Orlic. One person was wounded in Mojmilo by enemy fire from the Slavisa Vajner Cica barracks. In the 1st Glorious Olovo Brigade theater of operations, the aggressor used 120-mm mortars from Crna Rijeka to target Pogladina, while a self-propelled gun was used to shell the villages along the Krivaja River."

Muslim Offensive Drives 11,000 From Bihac

LD0111144994 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1404 GMT 1 Nov 94

["Pool" item]

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[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva, Nov. 1 (TANJUG)—More than 11,000 people, mostly women and children, have left western Bosnia, fleeing the Muslim offensive on Serb territories, a United Nations spokesman said Tuesday.

Spokesman for the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Ron Redmond said most of the 11,000 people from the areas of Bihac, Ripac, Martin Brod, Kulen Vakuf and Krupa had taken refuge in the towns of Petrovac, Drvar and Grahovo in northeastern Bosnian Serb republic.

Muslim troops ten days ago or so launched a strong three-pronged offensive from the U.N.-protected Bihac 'safe area' northeastwards towards Krupa, eastwards towards Petrovac and southeastwards toward Kulen Vakuf.

According to UNHCR figures, about 1,500 refugees have crossed into the neighbouring republic of Serb Krajina and are moving towards the town of Knin.

The independent republic Serb Krajina was proclaimed in 1991 in response to Croatia's unilateral secession from the former Yugoslavia and the removal of the Serb national rights from the Croatian Constitution.

Vice President Ganic Interviewed on Peace, War

LD0211011794 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 2230 GMT 1 Nov 94

[Interview with Vice President Ejup Ganic by Tihomir Ladisic on the "Picture vs. Picture" program—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Ladisic] Our guest tonight is Ejup Ganic, vice president of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Good evening Mr. Ganic.

[Ganic] Good evening.

[Ladisic] Following a lull lasting a few months and the Serb rejection of the peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina, right now, this evening, and last night, too, most TV studios are analyzing and giving their views on what is really going on in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Well, what is going on in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Ganic] We are waging a war of liberation. We had been negotiating for a year to preempt aggression, but because we did not have weapons we were attacked. Then we continued to negotiate through the mediation of the international community for another year. The so-called Vance-Owen plan was drawn up. The aggressor rejected this plan and continued the aggression. Then we negotiated for another year through the mediation of the contact group, which imposed another plan on us. Again we accepted this plan but the aggressor rejected it and continued with the aggression. Hence, we are now waging a war of liberation.

[Ladisic] You had a tete-a-tete encounter with Yasushi Akashi, the UN secretary general's special envoy, in Zagreb tonight. How is UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] reacting to the military successes of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army? Are you receiving any demands for putting an end to these operations? On the other hand, what are you demanding from UNPROFOR at the moment?

[Ganic] At the moment we are demanding that UNPROFOR tell us what it can do during the winter on the basis of its mandate and what it cannot do. In other words, we are demanding some kind of clear and precise answer as to what we can expect from UNPROFOR. UNPROFOR has not voiced any significant criticism, nor would such criticism be appropriate as regards our operations that are geared toward liberation. We are liberating territory. We are the sovereign authority for all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and we are liberating this territory. On the other hand, we prepared ourselves for this. For two and half years we have been preparing our Army. We have a generation of trained officers. We have good units, particularly the infantry. We do not, regrettably, have enough weapons, but we are making up for this with the courage and resourcefulness of our fighters.

The enemy is losing the battle. He is somewhat disoriented. We believe that in the so-called second half-time things will shift toward the cause of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina who are loyal to the State of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Ladisic] What are the federation, government, and presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina demanding diplomatically at this moment—the lifting of the embargo on arms sales to Bosnia-Herzegovina, acceptance of the Contact Group plan, or something else?

[Ganic] As you know, the aggressor rejected the Contact Group plan; we accepted it, but the aggressor rejected it, so there is nothing new here. What we are demanding from the international community is to accelerate the process of resolving the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Balkans by lifting the embargo, because the lifting of the embargo would create a balance, and a balance would produce results at the negotiating table. This is what we are demanding of them. We hope that the Russians and the British will soon accept the fact that a just peace in the Balkans is in their interest as well.

[Ladisic] The loudest international reactions are presently coming from the United States and Russia, on the other side. Is it true that Bosnia-Herzegovina is enjoying the diplomatic and even tacit military support of the United States, and, on the other hand, are you afraid of the threats from Moscow?

[Ganic] As far as the Americans are concerned, we are not receiving any military aid. They are observing the embargo successfully, as are the other countries taking part in the implementation of the embargo.

As regards diplomatic support, the Americans are supporting the morality and legitimacy of our operations;

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this is the least they can do. We are expecting more, but are receiving this minimum for the time being.

We are not afraid of Russia's position. We believe that the preservation of a sovereign and single Bosnia-Herzegovina is in the interest of the Russian Federation. The virus they are indirectly supporting could prove fatal for them as well.

However, we believe that everything will be decided in Bosnia. Bosnia is defending itself by organizing internally. We have realized this because we demanded that the international community prevent the aggression. The international community could have done this, but did not. From that moment on we concentrated all of our efforts on organizing the resistance from within. We have significant human resources and an impressive military tradition, because the 1,000 years of Bosnian tradition are very important; we have taken part in all wars. I believe that this spirit has become revitalized for the sake of saving Bosnia-Herzegovina as a multiethnic community of all citizens who are loyal to this state.

Our human resources are very important. We have young officers trained in the war, and we have not used our reserves from the diaspora. However, the Bosnians are now on a one-way street. We can only go forward. How fast remains to be seen.

As far as the chetniks are concerned, they are on a two-way street. They can also go backward. Of course, we expect things to happen that way. Therefore, we want peace. Every liberation war is difficult. We are defending Bosnia so things can be as they once were.

[Ladisic] Let us go back to that symbolic idea of yours—to advance or to reverse. To what extent has the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army really managed to start advancing? And in which areas? This primarily refers to western Bosnia, the situation around Sarajevo and the latest success of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, not corroborated as yet, namely the fall of Trnovo and opening the road to east Bosnia.

[Ganic] You see, we preempted, in fact forestalled, the aggressor's attack on Bihac. The aggressor concentrated huge military potential in the vicinity of Bihac, and it was only a matter of days before it unleashed all of its potential. We made this preemptive move. On the other hand, you know that battles are raging around Kupres. We are conducting very advanced tactical operations. Our strategic-tactical operations will be more prominent at a slightly later stage. Unfortunately, we do not have a considerable amount of artillery, but we do have enough knowledge, we do have potent commando units, infantry units. We know where we are going to strike. We are going to decide on the time and the location of where we are going to put up resistance and how we are going to put up this resistance.

It is a fact that there are certain movements of the forces of the so-called Knin authorities. They are coming close to the positions of the 5th Corps. May I take this opportunity to warn the authorities in Knin against indulging in this activity because right now they are negotiating with the authorities of the Republic of Croatia about a peaceful solution. They should not use this umbrella of relaxation on the part of the Croatian forces and deploy their forces against the 5th Corps. If this takes place we will retaliate by sending our commando units behind the lines along a route of our choice.

[Ladisic] My last question. UN officials announced this evening that Croat Defense Council [HVO] units have joined the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army in its offensive in the Kupres area. Can you confirm this?

[Ganic] I am not in a position to confirm that at this moment. However, that would be good, and we expect HVO forces to join in because the soldiers of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army should not be the only ones to write and create the history of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is the duty of every patriotic citizen of Bosnia-Herzegovina to join in the liberation war and defend our state. I believe that it has become clear to the international community that the only solution that can bring stability to this region is a single Bosnia-Herzegovina. We will find modalities in this.

However, through the forming of the federation we have created a basis for a forceful liberation war; the federation also enabled us to overcome certain internal weaknesses. As much as we are not satisfied with the results—many things have not been done in practice—much has been accomplished toward the consolidation of military might. The energy we were wasting on internal disputes is now being directed against the aggressor, and I hope that time will slowly start working in Bosnia-Herzegovina's favor. We have plenty of time because we have no other choice.

[Ladisic] Mr. Ganic, thank you for being our guest this evening.

Serbian Prime Minister Views Current Options

AU3110125694 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian Serb) in Serbo-Croatian 25 Oct 94 p 5

[Interview with Srpska republic Prime Minister Dusan Kozic, by Dusanka Stanisic; place and date not given: "Government Is Still a Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Somewhat more than a month ago a reconstruction of the Srpska republic government was carried out. The new government led by Dusan Kozic, the new prime minister, started working approximately at the same time as the Srpska republic was put under isolation. When commenting on his new function, the prime minister of the third war government was hardly aware of the fact that he and his team would be facing a significantly more difficult situation than the two former governments. In an interview with the new prime minister we wanted to hear how successful the new government has been so far.

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[Stanisic] You are the third prime minister in the Srpska republic. Can you tell us whether the saying that "the third time God helps" has proven to be true?

[Kozic] I always trust God, not only in third attempts. Who else can we be grateful to if not to God for the strength he has given us to cope with the terrible problems that the Serbian Republic and its government have been confronted with since St. Elias' Day. On the other hand, I am afraid of all those who do not believe in God and who do not fear him.

[Stanisic] When introducing the new government, you said that the main criteria for the selection of new ministers were their professional competence, their party membership, their moral standards and the Serbian nationality. What have the last two months shown in this respect?

[Kozic] This short time has shown that the criteria I set for the selection of the government members were good. I think that the new ministers basically meet them. Even if the situation were different, I would still have applied the same criteria and I would recommend nobody to ignore these criteria.

[Stanisic] The parliament members expected and practically also required a more radical reconstruction of the former government. You changed only five ministers. Can you explain this?

[Kozic] When you require something, you make your requirement a little bit broader because you reckon with the possibility that it will not be possible to fulfill everything. If you require little, you get nothing. I do not agree with the opinion that the government has not been reconstructed thoroughly. When ministers of such important portfolios as defense, finance and internal affairs are changed, the reconstruction can be considered serious, especially if it is known that this goes hand in hand with changes in the second and third row at the respective ministry. When I say the second and third row I mean deputy ministers, their aides and other leading personnel. Our situation is not so good at the moment as to change the complete administration, although we are not quite happy with the present one.

[Stanisic] The SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] Coordinating Committee for Herzegovina did not support your application for the position of the new prime minister (this is what BORBA and POLITIKA wrote). Can you tell us the reasons for this rejection?

[Kozic] It is a constitutional right and an obligation of the president of the Srpska republic to propose a candidate for the position of the prime minister. The parliament decides on the proposal. This means that there is no competition, no self-candidacy, and no coordinating committee in the election procedure. The fact that some people from the SDS Coordinating Committee from the region I come from [Herzegovina] concluded that my election to the position of the prime minister was a good occasion for the promotion of their or somebody else's political antiprogram is a visible sign that they are not able to control their political and human ambitions. With a large dose of bad taste and human vanity they entertained the reading audiences with my name [Kozic comes from "goat"] for a time. Just like former Catholics do with the pope, they too quickly concluded that they should care more for the interests of the party than its chairman. By opposing me, they might have had another aim, too. I do not claim anything, but it is at least indicative that they made a fuss about my election at the time when strong political powers from Serbia tried to contest the legitimacy of the Srpska republic authorities, its leadership and even its existence. Just think of "arguments" against our referendum. In this context it is easy to recognize the persons who directed the whole thing, and the executors have disclosed themselves.

[Stanisic] Two months have passed since Milosevic "froze" the Drina River, and your government has been in office for more or less the same time. Can the government govern under the conditions imposed on it?

[Kozic] You have said enough in your question. From time to time there are waves of big problems, so that we have to ask ourselves if we can govern at all. Since there is not much time to ponder this question, we go on and successfully solved problems make us optimistic again. We have taken on a big obligation. We are doing our best, but the circumstances are extremely unfavorable. We do not expect to be admired. We have the right, however, to expect that our achievements are assessed objectively. We shall certainly not be able to fulfill unreal expectations. We are struggling for survival and we shall survive. Everything we achieve above survival can be considered a bonus under the current conditions. The conditions in which we are working are so difficult that nobody should envy us.

[Stanisic] Speaking about the sanctions at the end of August, you stated that "...it was a secret which position the new government would take toward the present situation...." Has the time come perhaps to disclose this secret?

[Kozic] The secret I spoke about is no longer a secret to the extent it was in August. We had illusions then that the UN Security Council would not find in Serbia the best instructor for carrying out the total blockade against our country. Therefore our secret has been partially reduced to the followed creed: There is a solution to every crisis. This might sound like baseless optimism, but I do believe that the present unfavorable situation will be over soon.

[Stanisic] Is the Srpska republic considering introducing its own currency, since the system of payments has been interrupted?

[Kozic] Despite the difficulties we have we are not considering printing our own money, because we know that we would lose by this move. It is true that our

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problems are a strong temptation. The government is organizing a congress now with our experts, economists and businessmen, about the options for alleviating problems in the fiscal and monetary politics. The Economic Council of the government will soon discuss this topic, too. The problems are more than complicated. The danger of improvisation is constantly present. I hope that we shall reach acceptable solutions without printing some sort of money of our own.

[Stanisic] Another winter of war is approaching. The soldiers in trenches will suffer most. What is the government planning to do in order to make the winter more sustainable?

[Kozic] Although they are serious, the efforts made by the government and its administration throughout the Srpska republic cannot compensate for the troubles the soldiers of the Srpska republic army are exposed to. Nobody has ever succeeded in paying back those who sacrificed everything they had for their state; we, too, shall always be obliged to the dead and living defenders of our freedom. The solders know how difficult our situation is and what we can do in order to make the situation somewhat more sustainable. It is already well known that this government has made it a priority to supply the Srpska republic army and to take care of the disabled veterans and of the families of dead soldiers. In other words, the government will do its best, and I hope that this will be enough.

Silajdzic, Ljubijankic Receive German Ambassador

AU0211071494 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 1 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Prompted by the initiative to form a body that would include the U.S., German, and Turkish ambassadors to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haris Silajdzic, the prime minister of the republic and the federation, today received the German Ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina Johannes Preisinger. Haris Silajdzic briefed Ambassador Preisinger on the initiative and pointed out that consultations about the same issue were in progress with the Turkish and U.S. ambassadors. He requested that the German Government be acquainted with the initiative. The German Government is expected to lend significant support in the further implementation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation Constitution and to support the legitimate interests of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the peace process.

German Ambassador Johannes Preisinger was also received by Irfan Ljubijankic, foreign minister of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. On this occasion, Minister Ljubijankic expressed gratitude for the aid that Germany is giving our country in the form of humanitarian aid and by accepting a great number of our refugees. We regard Germany as a friendly country and a significant partner both at present and in the future, said Minister Ljubijankic. The minister acquainted Ambassador Preisinger with the current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and stressed that we do not wish to create an Islamic state, but a multicultural, multinational, and multiethnic community that will be based on democratic principles of the modern world.

Ljubijankic Briefs Turkish Envoy on Situation

AU0211071394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 1 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Irfan Ljubijankic today received Turkish Ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina Sukru Tufan. Minister Ljubijankic acquainted Ambassador Tufan with the current military and political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ambassador Tufan expressed interest in Prime Minister Silajdzic's proposal that an independent commission of U.S., German, and Turkish ambassadors be formed, which would monitor the development and implementation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation.

The furthering of bilateral relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Turkey was also discussed, as was the approaching trilateral meeting of Turkish, Croatian, and Bosnia-Herzegovina foreign minister in Zagreb.

Izetbegovic Hails Local CSCE Mission

AU0111214494 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 1 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, today received the head of the newly established CSCE mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Hans Peter Kleiner). In member countries, the CSCE devotes particular attention to the protection of human rights, which is one of the CSCE's three main areas of influence. The introduction of the institution of ombudsmen in the Bosnia-Herzegovina legal system was discussed. According to international law, ombudsmen are introduced in countries that have been hit by major social upheavals, similar to the one in Bosnia-Herzegovina caused by the Serbo-Montenegrin aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina. President Izetbegovic hailed the CSCE's decision to establish a permanent mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and promised the full cooperation and support of the Bosnia-Herzegovina legitimate authorities.

Silajdzic Seen Blaming HVO, Blocking Federation

AU3110115494 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 23 Oct 94 p 5

[Article by Veso Vegar: "Low Blows to the Federal Partner"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Federation Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic has made the gravest accusations against the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] so far, presenting them also to certain members of the Security Council. Namely,

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he claims, as stated in the announcement of the Presidential Council of Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, that HVO artillery was firing on positions of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army during the Serb attacks on the wider Mostar region. The Command of the Mostar Regional Corps denied the credibility of this claim and presented arguments against it.

In the frequent contacts between the officers of the Mostar Regional Corps and the 4th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, there were often complaints that the HVO soldiers opened fire at Bosnia-Herzegovina Army positions, while the Army officers showed reluctance when asked to state the time and place of the attack. However, at the insistence of the HVO officers, they did state the time and place of the latest alleged attacks. The investigation showed that the attacks were invented, as usual. Statements from the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] members who happened to be at the stated place at the stated time corroborated that there had been no shooting.

Where do such accusations against the HVO come from then, and why are they repeated? Haris Silajdzic visited Mostar recently and met with Croat officials, but also with the Bosniak ones in the eastern part of the town. In the western part of the town he constructively discussed the implementation of the agreement, specifically the establishment of the police in all the municipalities, in accordance with the Federation Constitution and the new Law on Internal Affairs. However, were the talks in the eastern part of the town as constructive?

Did Silajdzic fall for the lies of the Army officers who thus wanted to justify their failure at the battlefield, since the place of the alleged artillery attacks is southeast of Mostar, precisely where the Army forces tried to ward off the Serb aggressor, or is the issue the scenario that could shortest be described as a NO to the Federation? We believe that there are few towns in Bosnia-Herzegovina in which there are as many Bosniak-Muslim supporters of this scenario as there are in Mostar.

Knowing that opposing the implementation of the Federation Constitution is politically counterproductive with the international public, another tactic was chosen, which is to present the federal partner as the one who is against the implementation of the agreement. We see that with this as the aim not much attention is paid to fair play, and that there have been some very low blows. They are trying to preserve this situation, waiting for more favorable conditions to be created for the activities of those who have never given up on the unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina, not under the pressure of the situation at the battlefields, of the international agreements, or of the plans for resolving the crisis.

There is much evidence that there are quite a few such people still. The military public announcements have lately introduced a new syntagma—"coming out at the historical borders of our homeland." They do not say what these "historical" borders are, nor where they are: Are they the borders of the medieval Bosnian state, of Bosnia as a Turkish province, or the border of Bosnia-Herzegovina after World War II. This ambiguous term, whose aim is to boost the morale of the soldiers and the people, could be justified, but what about the Croats as partners and the international obligations that have been taken on, such as the accepted Contact Group plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina? Has the Bosniak leadership discarded all the illusions and learned the lesson in realist politics on the suffering of their own people and the violation of certain regulations of international law, and has it started to act in an extremely pragmatic way, not paying much attention to their word and to morals?

It seems they have realized that the Contact Group plan is dead, as one of its creators, Alain Juppe, implicitly admitted. They no longer hope that the Serbs could accept the plan, and whether they had ever hoped so is questionable. Could this not be one of the reasons they accepted the plan?

Juppe's wish, and the wish of several other people from abroad, that this war drama end as soon as possible, even if they have to reward the Serbs for the aggression, has produced quite the opposite effect. The Bosniaks, aware of the situation and determined to achieve their aims, believe that they will retrieve through war what they lost through war. Naturally, no one denies their right to an ethnic program. However, in this they should take into account their partner, since if certain conditions for the actualization of some of their ethnic rights have been met, it was precisely through the Washington Agreement. They should not forget that—on the contrary, it would be very productive if they openly and honestly told their people about it. Spreading lies about the HVO launching artillery attacks and guiding the Serb artillery to the Army targets, is grist to the mill of the Serb aggressor. Even if the world accepted the fact that Croats are responsible for the collapse of the Washington Agreement, it would not help the Bosniaks, and it would make the job that the Serbs started long ago much easier.

[Box, p 5]

Prime Minister's Obstruction

At the latest session of the government of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, held in Sarajevo on Friday evening, it became evident again that Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic has been blocking the implementation of the Federation Constitution and the Zagreb Agreements. That is, Croat officials have reported that the prime minister openly opposed the implementation of the Zagreb Agreements and displayed great arrogance at the Government session. Haris Silajdzic refused the proposal that more Croats be appointed to the Federation ministries, displaying great arrogance about the positions of the Croat members of the cabinet. He also refused to put on the agenda, despite the Croat ministers' expressly stated demands, and contrary to the Zagreb

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Agreements, the proposal on appointing cadres to the embassies and consulates, which involved the appointment of Mile Akmadzic to the position of ambassador to the United States. The Law on Central Bank was also supposed to be discussed at the session, but Silajdzic prevented that, too.

Serbs Charge Journalists With 'Terrorism'

AU0211125294 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 1 Nov 94 p 6

[Report by V. Popovic: "Serious Accusations"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The investigations of 14 members and collaborators of the "Typhoon" [Tajfun] Information Center, which was founded two and a half years ago and attached to the 1st Krajina Corps [of the Srpska army], has officially begun. Among four of the accused, who made up the so-called Control Committee [Upravni odbor] of the "Typhoon" Information Center is Boro Maric, head of our [VECERNJE NOVOSTI's] branch office in Banja Luka. The charges are serious: a criminal act of terrorism (under Article 125 of the Criminal Law in connection with Article 129, Paragraph 2). Such acts committed in the conditions of direct war threat, as exist in the Srpska republic [Serbian entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina], carry the death sentence or a prison sentence of no less than 10 years. [passage omitted]

The core of "Typhoon" consisted of four people. The other accused are members of the military police. Branko Ratic is an active officer, and according to those detained, was killed trying to escape, although, officially, he is still at large. To judge from everything, the accused were deliberately given news of his death to "soften" them up. But let us return to the essence of the matter.

There is a well-founded suspicion that between the end of July 1992 and September of this year, during a period of direct war threat, the accused, exploiting the founding and work of the "Typhoon" Information Center (founded by President Radovan Karadzic as an information-handling body) acquired a large cache of arms, ammunition, and explosive devices to carry out hostile activities against the authorities in the Serbian republic and the institutions that facilitate its functioning. In agreement with their field agents, the four from the Control Committee organized a series of explosions and fires.

Nine suspects had been interrogated up until yesterday. Another four have not yet been apprehended. The charges refer to eight criminal acts, one of which is the planting of explosives in the Bosna Hotel in Banja Luka. [passage omitted]

The official lawyer defending our correspondent told us that he would demand that Maric be released "as no act of terrorism has been committed."

Srpska Republic Official on Energy Situation

AU0111125994 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian Serb) in Serbo-Croatian 25 Oct 94 pp 4, 5

[Interview with Srpska republic official Boro Bosic by Lj. Ljubojevic; place and date not given: "There Will Be Electricity, But...."]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The reason for an interview with Boro Bosic, minister for energy and power generating industry in the Srpska republic government, was not only the approaching winter but also many warnings and appeals to the citizens, particularly refugees, to save electricity and provide coal and firewood supplies in time, so as not to shiver with cold while sitting by empty ovens in the days ahead. Because, as was announced by placards posted in front of the Red Cross office where refugees and displaced persons stop most frequently, there might not be enough power. Therefore the first question to Bosic, minister of mining, industry and electric power industry, was:*

[Ljubojevic] What is the current electricity situation in the Srpska republic?

[Bosic] Nothing has changed substantially with the blockade imposed on us by the FRY, for one simple reason: We have our own sources of power, sufficient for our needs. True, power is partly conveyed through the FRY, but one should keep in mind that the region of former Yugoslavia has never been cut off from power supplies. Which is to say, even today power supplies in Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, and Romania operate according to a unique system, and disconnects from West Europe occurred because of war operations and damages. Which is to say, as for the situation with electric energy, except for the problems in certain places regarding conveyance, we still can say that we are satisfied. That is, the situation is satisfactory.

As for coal, there should also be no major problems, provided there is enough oil to fuel the mining machinery. The Srpska republic has enough coal and is able to provide for its own needs; according to our assessments, we could even put aside around 1 million metric tons of coal for sale on other markets. Certainly, the most difficult situation is oil and oil products. We do not have wells of our own, so we are forced to purchase exclusively, that is, import oil. Due to the embargo and sanctions, oil procurement is one of our most difficult problems. However, we must quickly react in that regard as well. We are aware that available quantities cannot meet all our needs. Priority is given to defense, that is, the army, certain services like health care and education; the remainder will be used for economy, farming and so forth....

Gacko Is Working

[Ljubojevic] The situation is becoming even more complicated because autumn planting awaits us, and the winter is coming, which presupposes greater electrical consumption for heating.

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[Bosic] The ministry of farming has already proposed the program for the autumn planting to the government. There are two problems concerning it. I feel free to explain them. The first problem is financing the planting; the second problem is fuel provisions. Regarding oil and oil products, we, in the newly formed energy supplies staff, will attempt to save a certain amount of fuel for sowing needs, however, I repeat, there will not be enough. Here in Semberia [lowland in northeastern Bosnia], the situation is somewhat better, because local citizens will probably provide for some of their needs themselves, from Serbia and the FRY. As far as electric energy is concerned, we are aware of the fact that the consumption will increase because of winter. Fortunately, supplying power plants with water is much better at that time of the year, so power production will be somewhat better. We have taken measures to reactivate the Gacko Power Plant, so as to improve the situation with the additional power production. We assess that, regardless of the increased consumption of power, there will be no problems in the energy production field. However, there will be problems with its allocation, because the distribution network is not designed for the current overload and probably there will be some small fires, disconnects or breaches in electrical supplies. Which is to say, there will be allocation problems in the power distribution network, as opposed to energy production.

[Ljubojevic] In which sector is the situation currently most difficult in terms of supplying energy and maintaining the system?

[Bosic] Regardless, maintaining power plants is difficult, particularly those that work 24 hours a day, that is, incessantly, at 100 percent capacity. Certainly, at this time neither the power distribution network nor energy producing systems in the Srpska republic are able to provide top flight maintenance of those works. At this stage we have problems in regions where the power grid has not yet been installed. I refer to Mt. Ozren, Kupres, certain parts of Sarajevo, as well as to the region of Banja Luka, which have not completely settled the problem of power grid yet. So, those are the distribution problems. There will be maintenance difficulties as well, but the regions will have to settle those problems on their own.

Rational Consumption

[Ljubojevic] You have mentioned power supply personnel. Do you have any plan to ration and save electrical energy under these difficult war conditions?

[Bosic] The staff analyzes the overall electric energy situation weekly. This means that we have an insight into the situation regarding electric energy, coal, gas, oil and oil products. We are trying to ration what we have at our disposal. One thing is for sure—the consumers must be careful about rational consumption of all fuels, primarily oil and oil products, which are pretty scarce. Whether we like it or not, we will have to ration what we have. As for other energy sources, I have already said that the situation is somewhat more favorable in that respect, but does not allow for excessive or wasteful consumption. I would like to use this opportunity to appeal to the public through your newspaper, to use other sources of energy and fuel as much as possible this winter. I refer thereby chiefly to coal and firewood; people should not rely exclusively on electric energy, because, I repeat again, there will be problems regarding its distribution.

Oil Procurement

[Ljubojevic] Please tell us one more thing in conclusion. Since the former government burned their fingers quite extensively regarding importing oil and oil products, how do you plan to curb smuggling now, and how is it possible to legally obtain the necessary fuel sources?

[Bosic] Well, this government concluded at one of its meetings that despite not being responsible for mistakes by the previous government, the stigma has been left to us. There were several such incidents, including one regarding oil procurement. It has been decided that all those incidents should be cleared up, and if any government member happens to be involved in these incidents, or is responsible in any way, he will have to assume the consequences. This government will not hide anything. As for the procurement of oil and oil products, we will attempt to obtain oil in the most honest and legal possible way. However, this should be put in quotation marks, because we cannot publicly discuss the conditions under which we import oil. The price at which we buy oil is much higher than normal. Because we are subject to sanctions under the embargo, and for that reason we pay a much higher price than we usually do. However, we'll try to work this out in the most favorable way, so that none of us is stained with that oil, as was the case with the previous cabinet....

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Krajina-Croatia Talks To Resume in Topusko 3 Nov

LD0111150794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1445 GMT 1 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin, 1 Nov (TANJUG)—The second round of negotiations on economic relations between the republic of Serb Krajina and Croatia will be held in Topusko on 3 November, Serb Krajina Foreign Minister Milan Babic told TANJUG today.

According to Babic, preparations for the resumption of the negotiating process in Knin have already begun.

Martic: Zagreb-Knin Agreement Must Be Ratified

AU0211100494 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 1 Nov 94 p 2

[BETA-attributed report: "RSK Assembly Will Decide on the Agreement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin—Milan Martic, president of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK), stated yesterday that the Krajina negotiating team is only authorized to initial an agreement between Knin and Zagreb. "The signature can follow only after the RSK Assembly ratifies the agreement," Martic told SRNA.

Commenting on the ongoing Serb-Croat talks, Martic said that the most important thing is that they have continued "on an equal footing, as talks between two sovereign states."

He holds the view that the signing of an agreement on the opening of the highway and oil pipelines "will not be possible without a clear and written explanation of Security Council Resolution 820."

This resolution has tightened sanctions on Yugoslavia, and the Krajina Serbs are of the opinion that it should not refer to areas under their control. "During the most recent visit to Knin by the co-chairmen of the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, we were assured that the provisions of the aforementioned resolution would be clarified," Martic said, adding that he expected a written statement on this matter from the co-chairmen.

Martic also expressed satisfaction that "Croatia has finally realized that continuing the talks is the only way to resolve conflicts."

Krajina SDS To Reveal 'Serb Federation' Concept

AU0111150994 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 1 Nov 94 p 6

[Report by "C.M.": "A Serb Federation To Be Discussed by the SDS of Krajina"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin—A Serb federation concept, that is, the unification of all Serbian lands, will be discussed today at the session of the Executive Committee of the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] of Krajina. The concept is to be presented by Milan Babic, party leader and RSK [republic of Serbian Krajina] foreign minister.

"This is a concrete approach to the realization of the Krajina SDS program for the creation of a unified Serbia. The RSK should act on two tracks on the international scene. The first being negotiations on economic issues with Croatia under the auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, and the second one being the initiation of a political dialogue with the Srpska republic and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the political integration of the Serbian and Yugoslav territories into one state, bearing in mind the international position of some sections of the Serbian nation, as well as legitimate Serb national interests," Milan Babic said prior to the committee session.

The Serb federation concept will be revealed to the public after the session of the Krajina SDS Executive Committee.

Serb Unification Options

LD0111194094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1926 GMT 1 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Knin, Nov. 1 (TANJUG)—The governing party of the republic of Serb Krajina on Tuesday revealed its project for a unification of the Serb states.

The project, presented in two possible variants, envisages an integration of the republic of Serb Krajina, the Srpska republic and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY], i.e. the republics of Serbia and Montenegro.

The draft program for Serb unification was presented at a session of the executive council of the Serb Democratic Party of Krajina (SDS-K) and explained in detail by Milan Babic, Krajina foreign minister and party president.

Babic said the opening of a political dialogue with the Srpska republic and the FRY on integration into a single state was Krajina's diplomatic priority.

The republic of serb Krajina was formed in 1991 in Serb ethnic and historical territories after Croatia's unilateral secession from the former Yugoslav federation, while the Bosnian Serbs proclaimed their own republic in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992.

Under the first variant of the proposed project, Krajina and the Srpska republic would first form a federation which would later enter a confederation with Yugoslavia. This variant is modelled upon the Muslim-Croat federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is to establish confederal ties with Croatia. Bosnian Muslim and Croat officials last March signed an agreement to that effect under strong pressure from the United States.

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The other variant proposes that Krajina and the Srpska republic establish separate confederal ties with Yugoslavia over a transitional period, before they finally become federal members of the FRY.

The project will be submitted to Krajina's government and assembly with a request to become an official state project, member of the party executive council Drago Kovacevic said.

The SDS-K has 32 deputies in Krajina's 84-seat parliament, while the Serbian Radical Party of Krajina is the second strongest, followed by the Serb Democratic Party of the Serb Countries, which is led by Srpska President Radovan Karadzic.

RSK Minister Resigns Over National Policy

LD0111142094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1316 GMT 1 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin, 1 Nov (TANJUG)—Borivoj Rasuo, minister of information in the government of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], resigned today.

In a letter to the chairman of the RSK parliament given to the media, Rasuo cites as reasons for his resgination the disagreements with the government over vital national policy issues, above all the union of Serb states.

Regarding the RSK government's activities, Rasuo points out that after his open letter to the government in which he demanded answers to several questions, he came to the conclusion that "either the RSK government does not have answers to his questions in which case it cannot lead the RSK or, even worse, it does not want to answer the questions in which case it cannot stay in charge of the the RSK."

Rasuo stresses that reasons for his decision existed earlier and that he postponed his resignation only because he was of the opinion that no one had the right, without a valid reason, to abandon the struggle for the realization of the just goal of the Serb nation—the establishment of its national state.

"Let my resignation be yet another indication that the RSK government is avoiding tackling key issues and that its passive stance is leading to a political outcome which is against the will and interests of the Serb nation," Rasuo points out in his letter. He goes on to say that "somebody will have to pay the price for the irresponsible behavior of the RSK government".

"Time will show if the settling of accounts should have begun with me," the RSK minister's letter of resignation says in conclusion.

Roundtable on Security in SE Europe

94BA0416A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 16 Sep 94 p 2

[Article by Croatian News Agency (HINA): "Security—Only With a Balance of (Military) Power"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb—A two-day meeting has been held in the School of Political Science at Zagreb University in which scholars, political scientists, lawyers, and prestigious political figures and officials of the Republic of Croatia debated the topic: "Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina: War in Europe and the Crisis of Collective Security."

Corps General Anton Tus, chief military adviser of the president of the republic, who spoke on the second day of the roundtable discussion, said that Croatia advocates a peaceful way out of the crisis in this part of southeastern Europe. Gen. Tus took the position that a constructive transformation is taking place in the system of international collective security, and even though tensions have grown and conflicts have broken out at certain strategic points, "the increasing number of new sovereign states will try to raise their own future and the future of their region to a much higher level of quality."

Crisis has always existed, and this one today is nothing new, and only as the bloc tensions have relaxed has it taken on more and more forms of regional instability, Gen. Tus said, emphasizing that he is relying on the mechanisms of the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe], the United Nations, and other international associations in bringing about stability. He emphasized Croatia's intention to act effectively and consistently along those lines.

"As far as southeastern Europe is concerned, the countries must reach regional agreement on limitation of conventional arms. This means that the military power of a particular country must first be brought into line with the size of its population and area. Along with others, then, Serbia would have to bring its military power into line," said the principal military adviser of the president of the republic.

In addition to the well-known principles, Croatia would advocate a strengthening of defensive capability and national identity, territorial integrity, a strengthening of regional security, friendship with neighboring states—Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Hungary, and Italy—and a plan for a peaceful termination of the war, Gen. Tus said, adding: "Only when all those principles are satisfied will it be possible to have balance and regional security."

Turning to the state of war, Anton Tus made the assessment that Serbia favors a peaceful termination of the war even now, because it judges that it will in this way achieve the best preservation of what it gained by war. The present situation could end with a freezing of the situation and a gradual removal of the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, establishment of a state within a state, and after that there would be years of neither war nor peace. That possibility is realistic, and Serbia would like to see it, as would certain other external factors, Tus said. The other, optimistic, possibility, which has less prospects, is fulfillment of the plan of the Contact Group, i.e., complete isolation of forces which do not

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accept it—the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia. Then UN forces should have a mandate to make peace, and the plan would have to include disarmament in this part of the Balkans, said Corps Gen. Anton Tus, chief military adviser of the president of the republic.

Numerous scholars and politicians, among them Horst Weisel, German ambassador in Croatia, spoke about the shortcomings and features of European collective security at the meeting.

Prof. Tomislav Jantol, dean of the School of Political Science at Zagreb University, spoke in his introductory address on the first day of the meeting about mechanisms of collective security, and he said that they almost do not exist if we take the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina as an example, except for those declared in resolutions and statements of a powerless international community.

Collective security is not working at all, Prof. Vladimir Ibler said, giving as his reason for this the lack of will and resolve on the part of states to subordinate their own interest to the collective interest. Nevertheless, Professor Ibler believes that Croatian foreign policy should be directed toward improvement of the functioning of the collective security system.

Prof. Nina Vajic said that force is the main factor in maintaining collective security, warning that at the same time the United Nations does not have its own armed force, but "'borrows' an army and 'returns it' to the member countries, and in that way indirectly satisfies their interests." Even if it worked, collective security would only be a mild remedy for all the sufferings of the contemporary world, said Prof. Budislav Vukas.

Parliamentary Deputy Drago Krpina said that since World War II collective security has been based on the balance of fear between the two world blocs, and he went on to speak about the Serbian minority in Croatia as an instrument of aggression motivated by Serbian expansionism. Branko Salaj, ambassador of the Republic of Croatia in France, said that many political systems are insecure within, and this is manifested as their insecurity in international relations.

There is no world order, there is only an imitation of it, said Prof. Zdravko Tomac, and in that connection he said that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a battleground for the struggle between differing conceptions of world politics.

Almost all the participants in the roundtable discussion agreed that collective security mechanisms, well-conceived in theory, get lost or are completely destroyed in practice.

Significance of Seks' Assembly Appointment

95BA0015B Split FERAL TRIBUNE in Serbo-Croatian 10 Oct 94 pp 7-8

[Article by Zoran Daskalovic: "Something New on Mark's Square: 'Seksss... Refreshingly Bitter!'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After waiting half a year for the green light within the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] to realize his wish, which had been publicly expressed, Vladimir Seks has finally returned to the Assembly of the Republic of Croatia. Even those among the deputies who are not well-disposed toward him have been speaking favorably in the corridors about the first days of his activity as the new vice president of the Assembly and president of the HDZ Caucus in the House of Representatives. So, his return to the Assembly is still more impressive because of the fading of Nedjeljko Mihanovic and the impersonality of Adam Mestrovic, although Seks himself deserves the greatest credit for the persuasiveness of his announcements that he will fight for the Assembly to finally have that part of political power intended for it under the Constitution.

The Valentic government has already felt on its own skin the new relations in the distribution of power in the triangle made by the president of the republic, the Assembly, and the government, but the first messages have also gone out to Franjo Tudjman. That is, including debate of the most recent resolution of the UN Security Council on the agenda also smacks of a bill being sent to the Assembly for what Croatian diplomacy, led by Tudjman, has done on the East River. Although it is likely that Tudjman will once again be represented before the deputies by Minister Mate Granic, the Assembly is for all practical purposes sending him a message for the first time that it no longer wants to learn about the specific moves of Croatian foreign policy only from the newspapers.

It is clear, however, that both the realization of Seks' wish and the strengthening of the Assembly's position are occurring with Tudjman's consent. The only thing that is doubtful is whether this is an expression of a change of course and a new commitment to share with the parliament at least some of all that great power concentrated in his hands, or a move forced by the new balance of power within the Croatian Democratic Union? That is, following the relatively successful showdown with the Mesic-Manolic followers in the spring and retention of the deputy majority in the Assembly, Tudjman found himself surrounded almost entirely by "hard-liners," radical HDZ-ites. Even back when HDZ enthusiasm was running high, Seks was saying out loud that he wanted the Assembly for himself and those who think like him. And he obviously has waited patiently for half a year while Tudjman deliberated what he would do for him.

Someone Knowledgeable and a Fighter

Actually, Seks was in a position to wait calmly, because many of those things have gone his way. It is evident that Tudjman had an urgent need in the Assembly for a fighter and someone who knew procedure, a man able to win at the political game, but also capable of "patching up things" when required, in order to set the groggy HDZ deputies firmly on their feet. Even with a candle he

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could not have found anyone better than Seks on the shelves of his personnel closet. At the same time, Seks has bared his teeth to him more than once already. And the general obviously does not like that in the least. What is more, before the conflict with Mesic and Manolic, the only attempts at a putsch against Tudjman were associated with Seks. Although those quite familiar with the leading people of the HDZ and the relations established among them say that Seks will be loyal to Tudjman up to the moment when he becomes definitely convinced that the latter is politically dead. The bell has not yet begun to toll for that hour, and, if the assessment is accurate, Seks will be loyal to Tudjman for at least some time yet and will carry out his key orders. On the other hand, in a situation where after Mesic and Manolic both Valentic and Greguric had begun to slip out of Tudjman's hands, not to accede to Seks' wish would have been too much even for him. Seks, after all, has his own native political charisma, which cannot be said of very many in the HDZ, and he could jump out of Tudjman's boat and set off into independent political waters. For that matter, from the very beginning of the HDZ he has been a member of its narrowest nucleus (the HDZ's first appeal to the public, back in the time when it was operating as an illegal party, when the notorious Miroslav Solevic announced a march on Ljubljana with a stop at Zagreb, was conceived in the nighttime session by Tudjman, Brozovic, Mesic, Manolic, and Seks), and this inevitably left a trace in terms of appreciable political power and influence.

The first days of his administration of the Assembly, for which he was ready and waiting, provide assurance that Seks has weighed things carefully and found that the circumstances have now taken such a shape that he can swim in them like an otter. And he was ready and waiting not only for that portion of Assembly events that take place in front of TV cameras, but also for the preliminaries, which take place far from the eyes of the public, in the Deputy Caucus, in agreements with the leaders of the opposition, with the government, with President Tudjman, of course, but also in the corridors, and even with respect to journalists and the media. In recent days, that is, it has been noticeable that he is not encountering even journalists, whom he categorized as "polluters of Croatian media space," with a sullen frown. Incidentally, he has won the fight for one of the most important roles on the political scene in the Assembly, one which is ideal for him to finally become a megapolitical star.

The Pathway to the Stars

And by all appearances Seks has no intention of letting the opportunity slip. He has set out to discharge his obligations to President Tudjman and the HDZ zealously. Because this is above all to renew and strengthen the positions of the HDZ in the Assembly, and thereby with the public, this is not difficult for him, because this is advantageous both to him personally and to his followers. At the same time, he is in this way stabilizing his relations with Tudjman and denying him an opportunity for a conflict in which he, Seks, would get the short end, because he is still the weaker side. This zealous performance of the homework assigned him by Tudjman is not the only indication that Seks is aware of the direction from which he can expect the greatest danger on his road to the stars. That is, there are quite a few signs that at the very outset of his taking root in the Assembly he also began to win over future allies for a possible conflict with Tudjman, although he does not have the least desire for that conflict now. Leaders of the opposition parties have been most sensitive to this. Although they themselves say that there is not any kind of agreement, but more of a political fluid in which mere signals have been emitted, they are nevertheless reading Seks' call for cooperation in strengthening the position of the Assembly, indeed even vis-a-vis Tudjman's positions. Except that they also suspect that he intends to lead the dance and intends to make use of them in doing so.

Leaving that to one side, even now the leaders of the opposition have become involved in this real or desired preliminary of Seks' for at least two reasons. One is that strengthening the political influence of the Assembly is also a priority of theirs, and the other is that any further stratification and possible conflict within the HDZ is exceedingly favorable for the political options they advocate. Ante Prkacin even goes so far as to judge that yet another conflict within the HDZ would be useful to Croatian national interests, because Tudjman's policy toward Bosnia and Herzegovina, the source of the greatest present troubles of the Croatian state, would finally be cast aside. Be that as it may, the opposition is ready to support Seks in his efforts to strengthen the Assembly and to weaken Tudjman, even at the price of strengthening him politically, but they are wary of the possibility of Seks pulling the wool over their eyes, pacifying them, and then delivering them up to Tudjman.

The Installer of the Officer Corps

Seks' arrival in the Assembly has in any case initiated a delicate and perfidious political contest in which pulses are for the present being taken on less essential issues. The first interparty agreements to put certain items on the agenda have ended successfully with a compromise. In addition, the opposition has been almost zealous in supporting Seks' intention of installing in the Assembly a new political party: the body of officers or Presidium of the Assembly. More accurately, to revive it, because it did function in the first convocation of the Assembly. However, after the conflict with Zarko Domljan, who then was president of the Assembly, Tudjman and the top leadership of the HDZ did away with the Presidium of the Assembly, in the judgment that a new center of political power that would be beyond their control was being created within it. After all, although it was formerly defined as the leadership of the Assembly, and its basic function appeared to be the technical preparation and organization of the work of the Assembly, it very

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quickly gained political strength, because it was in a position to channel decisively the views and activity of a majority of the deputies.

Seks, but also the opposition, has a need right now for just such a political body that would not be under Tudjman's direct guidance. And it would be the only one which he could not convene when he pleased and turn into a mere executor of his will. Seks would in that way strengthen his position and influence in the Assembly still more, and because Tudjman has begun to weaken the positions of his supporters in the zupanijas, cities, and opstinas, as well as in the HDZ hierarchy, the Assembly remains his last, but also strongest, support point for political activity. The opposition would be brought at least a step closer to the center of power and political decisionmaking, if only to add spices from time to time in that kitchen. Indeed, those spices for which President Tudjman has no liking, waiting for the day when someone in its ranks would put the cook's cap on his head. However it turns out in the end, Seks' arrival has even now made the Assembly far more interesting, and probably even a more influential battlefield in the shaping of the policy of the Croatian state. Which in itself is something, because the Presidential Palace, as so far the sole and elite locus of decisionmaking, has become boring and fraught with a totalitarian danger.

Article Views MUP Minister Jarnjak

95BA0013B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 4 Oct 94 pp 13-15

[Article by Gordan Nuhanovic and Boris Komadina: "A Good Man From the Zagorje Hills"]

[FBIS Translated Text] When in the early spring of 1992 he accepted the position of the first chief of the Croatian police, Ivan Jarnjak probably did not even suspect that he would celebrate St. Mihovil's Day, which is Croatian Police Day, three times while he was in that office. Perhaps because of the altogether transparent fact that at that time the police and its "lightning rod" were taking the heaviest burden of the war conflicts that had just passed, when their "tail ends" were bringing to the minister's office reports almost daily of new explosions, demolitions, and all kinds of murders and robberies. In political circles, the new police minister was in any case not received and praised at that time as any kind of "charismatic figure." On the contrary, for many people he was only "a man without a police pedigree," or, to put it mildly, an "apolitical man from Zagorje." But the false impression of an untouchable politician in the police was perhaps refuted in the best possible way by Ivan Jarnjak himself during his two-and-a-half years as minister, in that he supplied to police activity exactly what it lacked at that time—professionalism and superb competence.

The method which Jarnjak offered to Croatian law and order through the police segment of the executive branch was quite contrary to the very widespread conformist excuse that "under the circumstances of war the police must at times look the other way." The thesis that the excuse in the style of "it is wartime" can no longer be valid was one of the main items in the job description of the new minister of police, which in his rare interviews Jarnjak often liked to use and which at the same time still impressed many people at that time as an awkwardly written political pamphlet. Along with the entire range of concomitant difficulties, Jarnjak inherited from his predecessor, Vekic, not only a fairly confused state of security in the country, but also a number of unresolved issues related to the organization of police units and the decimation that occurred through the departure of the immense number of policemen of Serbian nationality.

Resistance to Change

The personnel "shortage" of 5,885 policemen, the number who left the Croatian MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] during 1990 and 1991, was supposed to be filled at least partially with persons whose education would not be based solely on having been hired at random as policemen, one reason being that the "deserters" included a considerable number of people who had worked in security and logistical jobs in the defunct Secretariat for Internal Affairs. Nor did Jarnjak conceal the fact that a sizable number of former policemen had continued their activity under the cover of the counter-intelligence services in Croatia, so that the "two-headed dragon in our own yard," who had the advantage of long years of experience, was a latent danger to state security.

But Jarnjak did not come to the minister's post altogether ignorant of the subject matter of the police and security. Even then he had served nine months in the MUP as Vekic's deputy with the task of coordinating all the operational sectors, with particular emphasis on the Service for Protection of the Constitutional Order. That change at the top of the police was only a small part of the "package of changes" that showered down on the top level of the government after Greguric took over the prime minister's baton. Certainly, looking from our vantage point today, there are few current politicians who will deny that the best transaction concluded at that time was the one with Ivan Jarnjak. As a matter of fact, if in a meeting of the cabinet Jarnjak should perhaps want to recall meetings that occurred two years ago, he will have trouble finding in his environment a "relevant" person to whom to talk, because in that time the personnel merry-go-round has made several turns in certain ministries.

A High Level of Professionalism

Although the length of Jarnjak's tenure is perhaps only the most transparent parameter of the functioning of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the rotations and dismissals of that lower segment of the personnel "pyramid," which as a rule occur far from the eyes of the public, also followed a logic of stability and continuity. The political corridors have long since been whispering that precisely this kind of self-denying and almost "infallible" work of

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a ministry has on several occasions been undigestible for certain circles, who—lacking any negative evidence at all in the work of this ministry—were attempting to play on the "card" of an alleged regional exclusiveness. Informally, Jarnjak was reproached for having "surrounded himself only with people from Zagorje," and in the spirit of the well-known professional rivalry between the various security services, a weekly recently published the anonymous confession of some employee of SIS [Security Information Service of the Croatian Defense Ministry] whose slant was clearly against the security service of the MUP—the Service for Protection of the Constitutional Order. It has, of course, all remained in the domain of "half-true rumors," to which the MUP and that service did not respond. For those who are best-informed, this was yet another proof of the high level of professionalism in the ranks of the present leadership of the Croatian MUP.

Many people will perhaps wonder even today what the minister and his MUP have done for the Croatian police. Perhaps this question is put partly because the "top Croatian policeman" gave a negligible number of interviews during his tenure, and even when he did give them, their main thrust was self-critical, deprived of any encomiums to the police or even any unverifiable "statistical data," to which the average citizen became accustomed under the last regime. As a matter of fact, what happened is what constitutes reality in countries with a high democratic standard: The minister of police is a man who was "just doing his job." And how he was doing it, and with what results, is perhaps best indicated by the fact that Jarnjak is the only minister for whom the entire opposition is ready to "put its hand in the fire." That support certainly did not come out of mere affinity. The long arm of the law, which is best personified by Jarnjak himself, did nevertheless manage to spread its "fingers" and in the course of two years improved the quality of its performance. Reorganization of the system of police education, which ended with establishment of the Police Academy, whose initiator was none other than Ivan Jarnjak, undoubtedly contributed to that.

From Mechanic to Director

An energetic and inventive spirit, a constant desire for professional advancement, and a fanatic devotion to his job are categories which can be confidently attributed to the credo of Ivan Jarnjak, and they can be seen more and more in the Croatian police as well. "Ivek" (this is Jarnjak's nickname) was born 9 April 1941 in picturesque Sinkovica Bednjanska (formerly Ivanec Opcina). After graduation from a vocational high school, he took a job in the Electrical Products Factory [TEP]. He spent his entire working life, all of 32 years, in TEP. He held every job there—from mechanic to general manager, which he left to become president of the Assembly of Krapina Opcina. Jarnjak's mild nature is hard to square with the fact that he has practiced karate for more than 20 years. Because he is a Black Belt, associates tell him in jest that he has no need whatsoever for the bodyguards assigned to him by regulations. His devotion to his job is best indicated by the datum that his workday begins at 0700 and ends at 2200 hours. Saturdays and Sundays are workdays, of course.

Moments of relaxation are rare. He prefers to relax in his own garage, where on an improvised weight bench he exercises tirelessly with weights. Unlike most people from Zagorje, Ivan Jarnjak is not a lover of wine and the hut in the vineyard. Only occasionally does he drop by the vineyard of his friend and "Zagorje neighbor" Franjo Greguric. The most entertaining among the police—his assistant Josko Moric, said to be a virtual joke factory, is able to put him in a good mood during the workday.

The name of Ivan Jarnjak has not been associated with a single scandal (although this is nothing rare among top-level officials). He did not get housing from the MUP, he lives in his family home. Aside from successful performance in the work of the Croatian police, the popularity of the MUP among journalists was certainly helped by the superbly organized Public Relations Department. It was Jarnjak, "a good man from the Zagorje hills," who instituted the practice of answering every letter that comes to the MUP. It is no wonder, then, that one of our associates said: Ivan Jarnjak is a minister of the police who seems like a minister of culture.

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TANJUG Sums Up Election, Future Prospects

LD0111204894 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2040 GMT 1 Nov 94

[Article by Goran Opacic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Skopje, Nov. 1 (TANJUG)—The governing Alliance for Macedonia coalition will most probably obtain a two-thirds majority in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] parliament.

The Alliance's presidential candidate Kiro Gligorov has won another mandate.

Diplomatic circles in Skopje believe this strong executive government, 'whose political option for good neighborly relations has defeated the opposition's prejudiced nationalism,' was the main condition for promoting relations in the Balkans.

The unofficial results of the second round of parliamentary elections, which took place over the weekend, show the Alliance won 89 of the existing 120 seats in the one-chamber parliament.

The Alliance for Macedonia consists of three parties: the Social Democratic Union for Macedonia, the Liberal Party and the Social-Democratic Party, which currently hold 57, 27 and 5 seats respectively.

Since the Alliance's candidate, Kiro Gligorov, won a new presidential mandate, it has practically secured legislative and executive power in the FYRO Macedonia.

The president of the Social Democratic Union for Macedonia is current Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski, and the leader of the Liberal Party is current Parliament Speaker Stojan Andov.

The second largest parliamentary bloc includes ethnic Albanian parties, which advocate greater rights for ethnic Albanians in the FYRO Macedonia.

The ethnic Albanian parties are distinctly divided into two groups: moderate and radical ones. The radical parties call for immediate and complete autonomy of western Macedonia, where the majority of ethnic Albanians live.

The two-third majority will enable the Alliance to change the FYROM constitution, as requested by the Serbs, who have not been mentioned as a nation even in the preamble of the existing constitution.

The unofficial results of a recent census show that more than two million people live in the FYROM. Between 67 and 69 percent have declared themselves Macedonians, 17-22 percent Albanians and about 2 percent (about 40,000) Serbs.

The powerful opposition has virtually blocked the work of the country's parliament for the past year.

The most influential opposition parties, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-the Democratic Party of Macedonian Unity and the Democratic Party boycotted the elections.

The two parties launched a peaceful resistance campaign against the government two days ago, accusing it of rigging the first round of elections on Oct. 16.

The results from nine election districts have so far not been released. The districts include those in which the vote had to be repeated because of irregularities.

Unofficial 2d Round Results

AU0211090994 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 1 Nov 94 p 3

[Article by V. R.: "The Composition of the New Parliament"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] After the second parliamentary election round, we have unofficially found out the names of the 111 members of parliament for the new Macedonian Assembly. Of the total number, 89 of the elected were candidates of the Alliance for Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], eight of which were elected in the first election round. In the second round, seven delegates of the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] were elected in addition to the two who were elected in the first round; the NDP [People's Democratic Party] won two deputy seats, the PCERM [Party for Full Emancipation of Romanies in Macedonia], the SDPM [Social Democratic Party of Macedonia], the DPT-PDA [Democratic Party of Turks-Party for Democratic Action]—Islamic Road, and the Democratic Party of Macedonia [in Tetovo] won one deputy seat each. According to the present data, seven independent candidates also won deputy seats in parliament. [passage omitted]

'No Serious Problems' Cited

AU0211090094 Skopje MIC in English 1 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] The joint assessment of the representatives of the international organizations and the foreign governments following the course of the elections in Macedonia [Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] is that the elections are proceeding regularly and that they mean a step forward in the realization of the democratic changes in Macedonia. Yesterday, the foreign observers held separate new conferences at which they announced their preliminary findings. Thus, the parliamentary group from the Council of Europe emphasized that the impression the delegation gained from the second round is that these elections were conducted in a free and fair manner, and that there was no nervousness and tension among the voters, which contributed for the second round to pass in a peaceful atmosphere. The European parliamentarians, at the same time, underlined that Macedonia's acceptance to the Council of Europe will be decided in January, adding optimistically

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that "in a couple of months, we will welcome the membership of Macedonia in the Council of Europe."

The representatives of the International Republican Institute believe that there were no serious problems in the electoral process and according to the impressions they gained in the course of the electoral activities, they assessed the election, on the whole, as correct. The observation teams of this institute emphasized in their reports that "they did not find one problem of such magnitude to undermine the electoral process."

A similar stand was also expressed by the delegation of the CSCE and UN observers, according to which the voting was regular. Yesterday, the representatives of the international organizations met with the President of the Republic of Macedonia Kiro Gligorov and the Speaker of the Parliament Stojan Andov. [passage omitted]

Alliance on Vote, Constitution

AU0211095894 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 1 Nov 94 p 4

[Report on news conference of the Alliance for Macedonia by B. G.: "A More Efficient and More Pluralist Parliament"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The Alliance for Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] won a great victory in fair and democratic elections, with international legitimacy." This is what Tito Petkovski, spokesman for the Alliance for Macedonia said at the news conference last night. Tito Petkovski informed the journalists that, according to the latest incomplete data, the Alliance had won 89 deputy seats, of which 57 were won by Social Democrats, 27 by Liberals, and five by Socialists. The coalition computer center revealed that, in 98 of 110 constituencies, as much as 54.65 percent of the electorate participated in the voting. Alliance candidates received 84,000 votes more than in the first election round.

Petkovski emphasized that the three parties will operate with independent deputy groups in the new parliament. Other parties and nationalities have had members elected to parliament also, and the Alliance spokesman confirmed that the new parliament will be more pluralist than the previous one and certainly more efficient. As for the absence of the opposition parties, Petkovski said it was not a pity and that it was good for democracy because "in this way, we have a more efficient parliament, a more stable government, and it will be easier to defend the state interests of Macedonia."

Tito Petkovski expressed his opinion that "the new composition of the parliament will change the Constitution in those areas where there is an evident need for it. Whether it is changed in the section relating to promoting relations with Greece is still too early to say because we have not yet received an official initiative from Greece," Petkovski stressed in his answer to a journalist's question.

Protest Votes Please Opposition

AU0211112094 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 1 Nov 94 p 3

[Article on the VMRO-DPMNE, the DP, and the MAAK news conference by E. S.: "The People Are With the Opposition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The interparty commission composed of two representatives of the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] and the DP [Democratic Party], as well as one from MAAK [Movement for All-Macedonian Action], held a news conference yesterday in the headquarters of the VMRO-DPMNE. They expressed their satisfaction with the protest voting for democratic elections of two days ago. According to the results issued by the VMRO-DPMNE spokesman Martin Trenevski, who is a member of the commission, 459,763 ballots were counted, which makes 33.79 percent of the official electoral roll. However, it was emphasized that this figure was not final because there are a dozen boxes that have not yet been opened out of 128 boxes located throughout the country. In Skopje, there were 21 such boxes, two of which, as we were told, were taken by the police together with all of the propaganda material. This happened in the village of Stajkovci. According to what the interparty commission said, the largest number of people to participate in the voting were in Skopje and Prilep.

Moreover, there were 70,000 written messages from citizens, from which a selection will be put in the so-called white book. This book will also be translated into English, so as to inform the international public on this event, as well. As was emphasized, the aim was to present the "feelings of the citizens in the Republic of Macedonia concerning the elections."

The leader of the VMRO-DPMNE, Ljupco Georgievski, spoke about the political aspect of the elections at the news conference. He expressed his satisfaction with the course of the protest voting and concluded that the numbers indicated that one could immediately gather 150,000 signatures from citizens for new elections. What is even more important, as Georgievski said, was that "this time the people demonstrated that they were with the opposition." According to Georgievski, the summary of results that were issued by the State Electoral Commission at 2100 hours on the day of the elections, half an hour before closing the electoral boxes, represented another possibility for manipulating the results.

Gligorov Supports Balkan Integration Into Europe

AU0211111994 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 1 Nov 94 p 2

[Statement by FYROM President Kiro Gligorov to foreign election observers; place and date not given: "Europe Is Our Legitimate Ambition"]

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[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] You are guests at the first free elections in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM] since independence, and you have performed good services for us, for which I thank you on behalf of the Macedonian people. I hope you were well received in our country and that you had all of the assistance you needed to reach your own conclusions about the situation here, and I want to thank you for that, as well as for everything you have done in the past days. I also hope we will cooperate during the next elections, too. This country is oriented toward democracy, and, what is even more important, it is oriented toward Europe. We did not want to join or have anything to do with the senseless war; we only want our people to be able to decide on their own on their destiny, and we see our future in Europe, in the European Union, and in tomorrow's common home of all European nations. The people have decided to support peace, and we want good relations with all of our neighbors. As was the case during the first elections after our independence, this time, too, you could see for yourselves that the people favor peaceful and democratic development. That is why neither now nor in the past elections, extremist feelings that are characteristic of the other former Yugoslav republics have been expressed here.

We also want our future laws, like the election law, the administrative law, the law on political institutions, as well as the economic laws that are linked to the market economy, to be passed by the new parliament with great assistance from the Council of Europe, the CSCE, and other European institutions, so that we may respect and include in our laws all European norms and standards. That is how you can understand our legitimate wish and legitimate ambition for Macedonia to become a member of the CSCE and of the Council of Europe as soon as possible. We want Macedonia to find its place among the other European nations. Our people have maintained their democratic views concerning the democratic establishment of relations in the Balkans and think that all of the countries in this region should aspire to Europe, that all of the countries should be democratic and turned toward the market economy. We want all the borders among Balkan countries to be open in order to have mutual cooperation. Let us all find ourselves on the road to Europe. Please believe that this small country and this nation will come up with its own initiatives, that it will fight and do its best to persuade all neighboring nations to struggle for the European option. This is the future for peace in the Balkans, which will no longer be merely a geographic part of Europe but an integral part of it. We shall also struggle to promote the concept of an ethnically mixed Balkans and that all the nations and minorities that live together in some states should live together in peace and mutual respect, in tolerance and cooperation. They should all share responsibility for the destiny of the Balkan countries. [passage omitted]

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Federal

President Lilic Receives Russian Envoy Zotov

LD0111202594 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2019 GMT 1 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Nov. 1 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav President Zoran Lilic on Tuesday received in Belgrade new Russian special envoy for Yugoslavia Aleksandr Zotov.

A statement issued by the presidential office said the talks had focused on ways for finding a lasting and just solution to the Bosnian crisis and on lifting the anti-Yugoslav sanctions in recognition of Yugoslavia's policy of peace. The statement said that Russia's representative in the international Contact Group for Bosnia, Ambassador Aleksey Nikhiforov, and Russian Ambassador to Yugoslavia Gennadiy Shikhin attended the meeting.

Zotov, who arrived on his first visit to Belgrade on Monday evening, also met with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic earlier on Tuesday. A brief statement released after the meeting said the talks had focused on the main aspects of the crisis in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, as well as on the steps for promoting the peace process. The statement said that Serbia's and Russia's joint advocating of lifting the sanctions against Yugoslavia represented support to its policy of peace and promoting the stability in the region.

Zotov replaced Vitaliy Churkin, former Russian deputy prime minister, as President Boris Yeltsin's special envoy for the former Yugoslavia, after Churkin had been appointed Russia's ambassador to Brussels.

Jovanovic: Peace Policy Increasingly Appreciated

LD0211013594 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2357 GMT 1 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Nov. 1 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic said Tuesday evening "the peaceful policy of Yugoslavia is increasingly being appreciated in the world." Jovanovic said the world now "realizes that it cannot seriously resolve matters of war or peace, and definitely not the topical issues of the Yugoslav crisis, without the cooperation of Yugoslavia, as an equal partner."

The Yugoslav foreign minister attended a reception organized by Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic for the participants in the 3rd congress of women's associations of Balkan countries. The congress is the first such meeting to take place in Yugoslavia since international sanctions were clamped on it in May 1992.

Jovanovic said the peace process could not be ended successfully if the sanctions are maintained. "I am optimistic regarding the continuation of the process of the sanctions' lifting," Jovanovic said. He said this depended on "breaking the resistance of those forces in the world which wish to maintain the crisis and war in former Bosnia-Herzegovina by maintaining the sanctions."

The United Nations imposed sanctions against the Yugoslav Federation of Serbia and Montenegro in May 1992 because of its alleged involvement in the civil war in former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Resolution 943 on the suspension of certain sanctions for a 100-day period took effect on Oct. 5 this year. The resolution pertains to air traffic, team sports and cultural cooperation.

Croatian Mortar Shell Lands in Prevlaka

LD0111161594 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1505 GMT 1 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 1 Nov (TANJUG)—At its session today, chaired by Radoje Kontic, the government adopted a memorandum on the procedures within the Group for Succession which will be sent to the international conference on Yugoslavia, the federal secretariat for information reports. [passage omitted]

At its session today the federal government was informed about an incident caused by the Croatian Army on 31 October around 1230 GMT when it fired three mortar shells one of which landed on the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the Kozen Do area in Prevlaka. The government said that this incident was a flagrant provocation and violated the cease-fire agreement and the resolution of the Prevlaka problem in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 779 of 1992.

The Yugoslav Government expects that the United Nations will condemn in the sharpest of terms the latest example of Croatia's conduct and prevent further escalation of its aggressive behavior in relation to the Prevlaka problem. The UN are expected to undertake adequate measures to prevent similar activities and force the Croatian side to strictly abide by the commitments they accepted and to respect a peaceful method of resolving all disputed issues.

The Yugoslav Army did not respond to the latest armed incident caused by the Republic of Croatia, the statement issued by the federal secretariat for information says in conclusion.

Commission 'Condemns' Destruction of Cathedral

LD0111165194 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1452 GMT 1 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 1 Nov (TANJUG)—Following the latest government reshuffle, the Commission for Relations with Religious Communities of the federal government held its first session today with Minister Zoran Bingulac in the chair.

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Among other things the commission considered a report by the Holy Bishops' Assembly of the Serb Orthodox Church about the damage to the Serb Orthodox Cathedral of the Ascension of the Holy Mother of God in Sirac, part of the Patriarchate of Arsenije the Third Carnojevic. Following this act of vandalism, the Croatian authorities, blinded by their hatred of everything Serb, passed a decision to have the cathedral destroyed, its remnants removed within 15 days, and the site dug over.

The federal government Commission for Relations with Religious Communities condemns this latest destructive action against the buildings of the Serb Orthodox Church and points out that conduct of this kind is in flagrant violation of the peace process.

The federal government commission will send a report on this latest crime to Federico Mayor, UNESCO director general, and to the relevant UN bodies, the commission says in conclusion of its statement.

Serbia

Milosevic Receives New Russian Envoy Zotov

LD0111151994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1430 GMT 1 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 1 Nov [TANJUG]—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic today received Aleksandr Zotov, Russian President Boris Yeltsin's newly appointed special envoy for former Yugoslavia. Aleksandr Zotov was joined by Ambassador Aleksey Nikiforov, the Russian representative to the Contact Group.

In the course of their cordial and friendly meeting, the two sides discussed the main aspects of the crisis in former Yugoslavia and steps currently being taken toward progress in the peace process. It was stressed that the joint efforts by Serbia and Russia aimed at having the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia lifted are contributing to the peace option and are also helping to increase stability in the region.

Today's talks were also attended by Russian Ambassador to Belgrade Gennadiy Shikin, and Goran Milinovic, head of the Serbian president's office. Details on the meeting were released by the president's office.

Zotov Comments

AU0111214894 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 1 Nov 94

[Video report on news conference by Aleksandr Zotov, newly appointed special envoy of Russian President Boris Yeltsin, following talks with Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade on 1 November—recorded; questions and answers are in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Unidentified reporter] Mr. Zotov, how do you assess the talks with President Milosevic?

[Zotov] These are my first steps on the South Slav territory. We had a very friendly and open discussion about all questions concerning the crisis on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. President Milosevic made it absolutely clear that he is firmly standing on the positions of peacefully regulating all aspects of the Yugoslav crisis. The international community should realize this and give a new impetus to the current process. Russia will do everything in its power to have this, what Belgrade has done, appreciated. I also think that all sides in the Bosnian conflict should be told to avoid a new wave of hostility as that is not in the interest of Europe either.

[Unidentified reporter] Did you talk about the complete lifting of the sanctions?

[Zotov] We did. We talked about what should be done with a view to achieving that. The talks were very successful, open, useful, and they present a guarantee for a future good cooperation with President Milosevic.

Serb Renewal Leader Endorses Talks With Croatia

AU0111172394 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 1 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Peace and the end of the war is the condition for a moral, democratic, and overall restoration of the country. This was stated by Vuk Draskovic at a news conference in the International Press Center. Biljana Jelic reports:

[Jelic] Vuk Draskovic welcomed the visit of Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic to Zagreb, and stressed that the ideal of fighting to the death makes no sense whatsoever.

Speaking about the program drafted by [Bank] Governor Avramovic, and its survival, Draskovic said that the program could survive if the sanctions were lifted and if other countries offer financial support in the form of loans for development. He stressed that radical reforms are necessary and that private ownership must be the basis for entrepreneurship

Regarding new elections, the leader of the Serbian Renewal Movement said that his party is more prepared for elections than any other opposition party, but holds the view that elections should not be held before peace is established since, as he said, the elections would in the end produce a similar balance of political forces.

According to Draskovic, problems in Kosovo-Metohija should be solved through compromises, through a political agreement based on the fundamental fact that Kosovo is an inalienable part of the Serbian state, and by

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offering the Albanian minority the maximum rights that it is entitled to according to the existing international conventions.

Montenegro

Russia's Zotov: Conditions Met To Lift Sanctions

LD0111210694 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2031 GMT 1 Nov 94

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Podgorica, Nov. 1 (TANJUG)—New special Russian envoy for former Yugoslavia Aleksandr Zotov said Tuesday all conditions had been met for the total lifting of the sanctions against Yugoslavia.

A statement released by the office of Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic said Zotov, who arrived in Yugoslavia Monday, was received by Bulatovic in Podgorica Tuesday. During the talks, Zotov reiterated Russia's principled stand that a just and lasting settlement should be sought to the crisis in former Yugoslavia, which would secure lasting peace and stability in the region.

Bulatovic said he hoped the international community would more completely than so far value the options and peaceful policy of Montenegro and Yugoslavia. He said he was confident Russia's Foreign Ministry would play a leading role in that process, as it always had.

The United Nations Security Council imposed comprehensive and rigid sanctions against the Yugoslav Federation of Serbia and Montenegro in May 1992 naming it the principle party responsible for the civil war in forner Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Zotov was received earlier Tuesday also by Yugoslav President Zoran Lilic and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.

Kosovo

Kosovo Serbs Launch Petition, Demand Action

AU0111101394 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 21 Oct 94 p 12

[Report by Radojica Barjaktarevic: "What Will Become of Us Tomorrow?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After several demands that the Serbian parliament bring up for discussion the problem of Kosovo and Metohija (demands submitted both to the former and the current body of deputies), as well as the announcement of rallies in Kosovo Polje and separate, yet more and more frequent demands for "marches" to Belgrade, a petition has appeared in Kosovo. Behind the demand that the federal and two republican parliaments (Serbian and Montenegrin) project the destiny of Kosovo stands the Serbian Resistance Movement of the 1980's, which actually generated Milosevic as president of the republic of Serbia. Everything else the Serbian people in Kosovo will cover with their signatures and the question: What is to become of us tomorrow?

Almost all party and association activists say they knew that something was being prepared, and a few of them even believe that it is high time for a shift from this status quo of neither peace nor war, and that people ought to know what is happening in and around Kosovo. As little as 15 days ago everybody—socialists, radicals, democrats, socialist democrats—knew about the petition launched by the resistance movement. The petition first made a round throughout Metohija, burdened with fear that tomorrow Kosovo might be partitioned, then throughout little Kosovo, after which it stopped in Pristina, where NIN published the integral text of the petition, thereby making it public. It then continued its mission among the people, going from hand to hand. Its initiators will assess when and where they will stop collecting signatures, after which the petition will be forwarded to Belgrade with the demand: Either answer the question or the people will move [well-known phrase, referring to the events in Kosovo in late 1980's, when Slobodan Milosevic rose to power] again.

Milosevic Has Failed

Be that as it may, in Kosovo many are wondering who the real initiators of that petition, denouncing current Serbian policy, might be: the people who established such a system, those who brought it to fruition, Serbian Resistance Movement members, or somebody from the opposition, far away from the center of power and political decisionmaking. Rather than give a clear answer to the crucial question, people most usually answer by their putting their own question: Do people who founded one party only to crush it now have any moral credibility? They also wonder where the limit of the Resistance Movement of the 1980's in Kosovo is: Is it assuming power from ethnic Albanians, or is it some different dimension that it has assumed, guided by personal interests? Since the Resistance Movement did not cease to exist with the takeover of power from the Albanian separatist movement; since its leaders, after having changed parties and associations, withdrew into deep opposition, it is much more likely that a few Serbs, on whom the petition counts, are looking for a new great leader. Until his arrival, little leaders will keep quiet under the umbrella of the current authorities, responding to which way the wind blows.

In Pristina the question is whether the people from the Resistance Movement are the rightful planners of the Serbian national platform and tailors of Kosovo's destiny—today or tomorrow, it is all the same. And whether the three parliaments, the federal and the republican, either do not answer or choose to forecast the real destiny of Kosovo and its Serbian people; and if the people act again, the question is how far it will go, and

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which direction it will take. Up to Belgrade, or, like Carnojevic [17th century Serbian patriarch who fought for the autonomy of the Serbian Orthodox Church], even farther? Why should the state give way and to whom, if it is legally established throughout its territory and the Constitution says so? Is the final goal the settlement of the Kosovo issue once and for all, or to organize a movement for some new leader?

Be it as it may, the petition has been launched. There it is said that President Milosevic was given a chance, but he failed, also regarding the blockade against the Srpska republic. The petition has been forwarded to all the political parties in Serbia and their branches in Kosovo. Around 2,000 directors, managers, doctors, engineers, party representatives and members have already endorsed it since the signing started in late August, right after the death of Tomislav Sekulic (the petition has been going from hand to hand, in full secrecy; later it will be forwarded across the Kosovo border to immigrants from Kosovo, in order to prevent it from being called separatist tomorrow). Those who have already signed it say that both natives and newcomers support it, that both Serbs and Montenegrins are subscribing to it, and that the number of endorsers will exceed 20,000.

Nine Demands

According to the plan worked out by the architects of the petition who head the list, a coordination group composed of representatives of all the relevant components will be formed, and a moratorium on political activities in Kosovo will be proclaimed.

"The Kosovo Serbs reject the destiny of Serbs in the Srpska republic. The Serbian people do not want any part in a policy of percentages. Deeply entrenched in this Serbian region, the Serbian people have a right to demand that all political and governmental forces in the country seriously reconsider the situation and find a settlement for Kosovo's Gordian knot. We believe that the Serbian people and state have the capability and wherewithal to halt this dangerous process and prevent the Kosovo Serbs from resuming old methods of struggle for the salvation of their own fate," it is said in the petition, which becomes public as of today. Subscribers to the petition, assuming responsibility for the fate of the Serbian people in Kosovo and Metohija, demand:

1. That Serbia clearly state its plans for Kosovo and how it intends to settle the Serbian question in the region;

2. That measures to halt the albanization process, so as not to lose Kosovo, be most urgently undertaken;

3. That nobody assume the right to renounce Kosovo and Metohija, regardless of the pressure to which he may be subject;

4. That the parallel ethnic Albanian state, the republic of Kosovo, be crushed;

5. That the people who are most interested in the settlement of the Serbian question in Kosovo, that is, the Serbs from Kosovo and Metohija, be by no means excluded from the process;

6. That mechanisms be immediately worked out and concrete measures taken for the protection of the Serbian people from ethnic Albanian separatism and majorization;

7. That the Plan for the Settlement of Kosovo be urgently adopted and money for its implementation be provided;

8. That Serbia at once adopt a citizenship law and settle the question of Albanian immigrants;

9. That a debate on Kosovo and Metohija, as well as on the achievements of Serbian policy so far be opened at the next Assemblies of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro sessions;

The petition conclusions, preceded by an formative meeting in Gracanica, were made on 23 August 1994 in Pristina.

The first subscriber is Kosta Bulatovic, followed by Bosko Budimirovic, Svetomir Arsic Rasara, Miroslav Solevic, Momcilo Trajkovic, and others. Exclusive rights to publish the entire text of the petition, BORBA has discovered, has been given to NIN, including several interviews by the leaders of the resistance movement.

BORBA Proposes Serb-Albanian Dialogue

AU3110085194 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 27 Oct 94 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Provocative Formulation of the Issue"]

[Text] At a time when Serbian state repression against Albanians is rising, it has been learned that the Serbian newspaper BORBA has planned to hold a discussion among Serbian and Albanian representatives on the issue "Kosovo-Metohija Tomorrow."

The invitation, also sent to representatives of two Albanian political parties in Kosova, states that the Serbian newspaper BORBA, with the aim of "helping to shed light on the so-called problem of Kosovo," has put itself forward as the convenor of a discussion on the topic "Kosovo-Metohija Tomorrow." The discussion is planned for 3 November on the "premises of the Kosovo-Metohija Chamber of Commerce," at "20, Vidovdan Street" in Prishtina.

Who Is Invited

The letter of invitation to the discussion states that the editorial board has invited "distinguished political and public personalities, representatives of the two peoples, as well as representatives of international organizations and diplomatic representatives of countries involved in solving the problem of Kosovo-Metohija."

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The editorial board also attached to the invitation a list of hoped-for participants.

The following are invited from the Serbian side (in the following order and positions): a representative of the Socialist Party of Serbia, a Serbian Renewal Movement representative, a Democratic Party of Serbia representative, a Serbian Radical Party representative, a Serbian Citizens League representative, Radmilo Bogdanovic, Mihajlo Markovic, Milos Nezovic, "a spokesman for the prefect of Kosovo district;" Momcilo Trajkovic, chairman of the Kosovo Social-Democratic Party, Ranko Bahic, and Bosko Drobnjak.

The following are invited from the Albanian side (in the following order and positions): Azem Vllasi, Veton Surroi, Mahmut Bakalli, Shkelzen Maliqi, Gazmend Pula; Fehmi Agani, deputy chairman of the Kosova Democratic Alliance; Mark Krasniqi, chairman of the Christian Democratic Party; and a representative of the Party of Democratic Action from Presheve.

The following international participants have been invited: representatives from the U.S., British, French, and Russian Embassies, a CSCE representative (Italy), and a EU representative (Germany).

However, although BORBA is occasionally called an independent newspaper, the short text of the invitation as always clings to the Serbian regime's views on Kosova. This is shown by the very formulation of the topic, which is provocative for the Albanians.

For the editors of BORBA, the question of Kosova is "so-called," while Kosova is arbitrarily called Kosovo-Metohija. This name denotes the most recent Serbian occupation of Kosova and the efforts to Serbianize Kosova through state terror against Albanians.

The editorial board's colonialist attitude toward Kosova and the Albanian side is also evident in the list of hoped-for participants.

Twelve party and state officials of the Serbian regime imposed in Kosova have been invited, six representatives of foreign embassies, and only two representatives of the Albanian political parties in Kosova. It is true that the "Albanian side" also includes representative of the Party of Democratic Action from Presheve and five individuals who represent nobody!

Although not declared as a representative, Radmilo Bogdanovic is a senior official of the Socialist Party of Serbia and at present deputy chairman of the Chamber of the Republics of the self-styled Yugoslavia.

Bogdanovic was chief of the Serbian police at the time of the culmination of Serbia's state terror in Kosova, while Mihajlo Markovic is considered the ideologue of Milosevic's regime.

According to the Regime's Logic

The list of Serbs includes Dr. Ranko Babic, an official of Seselj's party in Kosovo and an individual of the most extreme anti-Albanian views. Bosko Drobnjak's main claim to fame relates to the Serbian occupation of Prishtina Radio-Television. He is currently responsible for information for the Serbian occupation regime in Kosovo.

The list of hoped-for participants put forward by the newspaper's editorial board has evidently been drawn up with great care. Thus, the Albanian side, consisting of two party representatives and five individuals, is unequal in size to the Serbian side.

The organizer of the discussion has intentionally reduced to a minimum the representation of Albania's legitimately organized institutions in Kosova, confining the list to party representatives (and too few of them) and individuals, excluding state and public personalities. The Albanian side's stand is well known. The question of Kosova is an international issue that must be solved through equal and unconditional talks and with the mediation of an authorized international party.

Belgrade, interested in legalizing its power in Kosova and seeking to treat Kosova as Serbia's internal affair, has refused to talk to Prishtina, and has blockaded talks within the framework of the Geneva Conference, even on separate problems such as education.

It is obvious that BORBA's most recent initiative resembles that launched by the same newspaper two years ago, and pursues the path and logic of the Serbian regime in seeking to lower the profile of Albanian-Serbian talks on the issue of Kosova at a time when talks are accepted as inevitable.

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